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Movements in the Equity Premium 
REAL  BOND  RATES increased sharply  in the early 1980s and have re- 
mained  high  since. Even today, in the midst  of a world  recession  and  low 
U.S. and  Japanese  short  real  rates, long real  rates throughout  the world 
remain  unusually  high. Pessimists trace the high rates to a decrease in 
the supply  of capital.  They point  to the long string  of fiscal  deficits  and  to 
the decline in household  saving  and  warn  of the disappearance  of thrift. 
Optimists  trace the high rates to an increase in the demand  for capital 
and  point to the high  profit  opportunities  unleashed  by the conservative 
revolutions  of the 1980s. 
These factors have surely played a role. But there is more at work, 
for consider  the following  fact: while expected real  rates  on bonds have 
indeed been high  for more than a decade, expected real rates of return 
on stocks appear,  if anything,  to have declined slightly. This suggests 
that  the focus should  not only be on the increase  in bond rates, but also 
on the simultaneous  increase  in bond  rates  and  decrease  in equity  rates: 
on the decrease  in the equity  premium.  This is the focus of this paper. 
In the first  section, I construct  expected real  rates  on short-  and  medi- 
um-term  bonds for a number  of OECD countries  from 1978  on, using 
commercial  forecasts of inflation  available  at the time. I stop short of 
constructing  expected real rates of return  on stocks, but by looking at 
the underlying  components,  I argue  that the 1980s  were indeed associ- 
ated  with a sharp  decrease  in the equity  premium. 
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Having  reviewed  the recent evidence, I turn  in the second section to 
longer time series. This both provides a historical perspective and 
allows for the use of more sophisticated  time-series  techniques. Care- 
fully constructed  data  with a long time sample  exist for only a few coun- 
tries. I limit myself to the United States since 1927,  relying  on the data 
constructed  by Roger Ibbotson  and associates.  ' Using these data, I de- 
rive series for expected rates of return  on bonds and stocks. 
In the third  section, I present and discuss the implied  series for the 
equity  premium.  Movements  in the premium  since 1927  exhibit  two ma- 
jor characteristics.  The first  is a long  decline since the 1950s  from  unusu- 
ally high premiums  in the late 1930s  and 1940s. The second is move- 
ments around  this trend  that are clearly correlated  with movements in 
inflation.  This last relation  is particularly  clear  in the last two decades. A 
high  premium  in the 1970s  is associated  with  a sharp  increase  in inflation, 
while a low premium  in the 1980s  is associated with a sharp  decline in 
inflation. 
In the fourth  section, I focus on the low-frequency  movements  in the 
premium,  especially on the postwar  decline. I review plausible  causes. 
Some, such  as the evolution  of government  debt, can  be clearly  rejected. 
Long-lasting  effects of the Great  Crash  on perceived  volatility  appear  to 
be a good candidate  for explaining  the period of high premiums.  The 
slow disappearance  of those perceptions,  as well as the increasing  role 
of long-horizon  investors such as pension funds, can explain the post- 
war  decline. 
In the fifth section, I focus on higher-frequency  movements and on 
the role of inflation  on the premium  and its components.  This is much- 
traveled  ground,  and while I provide  my own econometric  estimates, I 
also relate the results to past research. My first conclusion is that ex- 
pected inflation  leads to a decrease in medium-  and long-term  real bond 
rates-but  only for a few years, at most. My second conclusion  is that 
expected inflation  leads to an increase in the rate of return  on stocks. 
Thus, lower inflation  leads to a lower premium,  with effects that  appear 
to be larger  in the short  run  than  in the long run. 
The trend  of the postwar  decline in the equity  premium  and  the pros- 
pects of low inflation  in the United States today both imply  that the eq- 
uity premium  is likely to remain  small. The sixth section explores the 
potential  macroeconomic  implications  of these findings. 
1. Ibbotson  Associates  (1992). Olivier-  J. Blanchard  77 
Returns on Bonds and Stocks since 1978 
I construct  real  bond  rates  by defining  them  as 
(1)  ER"(t)  =  I'l(t)  -  EAwT'(t), 
where 
(2)  A 7n(t)  =  [(I  -  8)/(I  -  8Z19  8 iE w  (t  +  i). 
i=O 
PI(t)  is the yield to maturity  at time t on a coupon  bond  of maturity  n, 
and  ERn(t)  is the expected real  rate  on that  bond. The expected real rate 
is equal  to the nominal  rate  minus  the expected value of a weighted  aver- 
age of inflation,  ir, over the life of the bond  (A is a mnemonic  for annuity 
value, a term that I use for convenience, although  it is not quite right 
given that  these are  bonds  of finite  maturity).  Weights  on future  inflation 
sum to one and decline at rate 8, where 8, the discount rate, is given by 
8 =  (1 + I)-  ', with  I the average  nominal  rate. 
I construct  real rates for both short-term  bonds (bonds  with a matu- 
rity of one quarter)  and for medium-term  bonds (bonds  with a maturity 
of close to five years). Sources and the exact nature  of the bonds are 
given in the appendix,  in tables Al and A2. In both cases, the only issue 
is to construct  the empirical  counterpart  to the last term in equation 1. 
In this section, my strategy  is to rely on forecasts of inflation  available 
as of the time the bonds were held. Forecasts over the relevant  horizon 
are available  from Data Resources Inc. (DRI) since 1978  for six major 
OECD countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, Italy, and Japan. For each of those countries, I construct a 
short-term  and  a medium-term  real  rate, using  the relevant  nominal  rate 
for the first month of each year, and the constructed  value of EA-rr'l, 
based on DRI forecasts as of December of the previous year. Con- 
structed  real  rates  for each year  and  each country,  as well as sources  and 
details  of construction,  are given in tables Al and A2. 
The results are summarized  in figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 presents the 
evolution  of the "world"  short-term  real  rate since 1978.  The world  rate 
is constructed  using relative  GDP at current  exchange rates as relative 
weights. In 1992,  those weights were 41 percent for the United States, 
25 percent  for Japan, 11 percent for Germany,  9 percent for France, 7 
percent  for Italy, and 6 percent  for the United Kingdom.  (The weights 78  Br-ookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
Figure 1.  World Short-Term Real Interest Rate,  1978-93a 
Percent 
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Source:  Author's calculations  as described  in appendix table Al. 
a.  The dashed  lines  indicate  the lowest  and highest  short-term real rates in each  year across  the  United  States, 
the United  Kingdom,  France,  Italy, Japan, and Germany. 
for 1993  are assumed  to be the same as for 1992.)  In addition,  to give a 
sense of the dispersion  of rates across countries, the lower and upper 
lines give the lowest and highest  short-term  real  rates in each year. Fig- 
ure 2 does the same for the world medium-term  real rate. Japan  is ex- 
cluded because forecasts were not available  for the entire period over 
the relevant  horizon;  the weights  of other  countries  are correspondingly 
adjusted. 
Figures  1  and  2 present  a familiar  picture.  They show a sharp  increase 
in both short-  and  medium-term  rates  in the early 1980s.  The short-term 
rate  climbed  from -  1.0 percent  in 1978  to 4.9 percent  in 1984,  while the 
medium-term  rate increased  from 2.1 percent in 1978  to 6.3 percent in 
1982.  Both rates  have declined  gradually  since the mid-1980s.  At the be- 
ginning  of 1993,  the short-term  real rate stood at 2.8 percent, while the 
medium-term  real  rate  was 3.5 percent.  Rates have declined  a bit  further 
since the beginning  of the year. 
These numbers  can be compared  to the numbers  for the only large 
market  where real  rates are directly  observable:  the U.K. indexed  bond 
market.  Indexed  bonds have existed since 1982  in the United Kingdom. 
There are a few caveats in using yields on those bonds, from the small 
initial  size of the market  to a number  of tax issues.2 But  for my purposes, 
the tax correction  is easy to make. Consider  first  the raw  numbers.  Real 
rates on five-year  indexed bonds were equal to 2.2 percent in the first 
2.  See Woodward  (1990). Olivier-  J. Blanchard  79 
Figure 2.  World Medium-Term Real Interest Rate,  1978-93a 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  as described  in appendix table A2. 
a.  The dashed  lines  indicate  the lowest  and highest  short-term real rates in each  year across  the  United  States, 
the United Kingdom,  France,  Italy, and Germany. 
quarter  of 1983,  increasing  to 4.5 percent  in 1986;  in the first  quarter  of 
1993,  they stood at 3.5 percent.  Tax considerations  suggest  that  this rate 
should  be adjusted  by adding  [T/(1 -  T)]Tr to it before  comparing  it to the 
real  rates  derived  from  looking  at nominal  bonds, where  X is the tax rate.3 
Thus, taking  X = 0.2, the value suggested  by G. Thomas  Woodward,  and 
ir = 4.0 percent,  each number  above must  be increased  by 1 percentage 
point. They can be compared  to the numbers  given in the appendix  for 
the U.K. medium-term  real rate: 2.3 percent for 1983,  6.7 percent for 
1986,  and  3.1 percent  for 1993. 
Real Rates  of Return on Stocks 
What  I have constructed  for bonds  are  in effect expected real  internal 
rates of return  over the relevant  horizons:  three months  for short  rates, 
and  around  five years  for medium-term  rates. Given my goal of comput- 
ing an expected equity premium,  I should  ideally compare  them to the 
corresponding  rates  for stocks: expected real  internal  rates  of return  for 
stocks  over holding  periods  of three  months  and  five years. Constructing 
such expected real internal  rates, however, requires  forecasts of stock 
3. The  reason  is as follows:  coupon  payments  are  taxed, but  capital  gains  are  not. Let 
i be the nominal  rate  on a nominal  bond, r be the real  rate  on an indexed  bond, and rr  be 
inflation.  Then,  assuming  arbitrage,  i(1 -  r) --r  = r(1 -  r). Define  rb =  i -  rr  to be the 
implicit  real  rate  on a nominal  bond.  Then,  rb  = r + [r/(1 -  r)]-r. 80  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
price  changes  over the relevant  holding  periods.  Such  forecasts  are  typi- 
cally not available, and even if they were, I would be reluctant  to use 
them.4 
Thus, I focus on the rate of return  that investors can expect to get if 
they hold  the stock forever. In that  case, the expected real  rate  of return 
depends only on the current  price and the sequence of expected future 
dividends. Stated roughly,  it is equal to the dividend  yield plus the ex- 
pected long-run  growth rate of real dividends. Thus, as the dividend 
yield can be observed, all that is needed to construct  estimates of the 
rate  of return  is an estimate  of long-run  real  dividend  growth,  a task that 
is easier  than  forecasting  capital  gains. While  this formally  gives only the 
rate  of return  one can expect by holding  stocks forever, it is likely to be 
a good approximation  to expected rates of return  over finite but suffi- 
ciently long horizons-say,  five years or more. 
More formally,  I define the expected real rate of return  on stocks at 
time t, ERs(t), as 
(3)  ERs(t) =  E[D(t)IP(t)] +  EAgd(t), 
where 
(4)  EAgd(t)  [(r-g)I(1  + r)] E  [(1 + g)I(1 + r)]iEgd(t +  i +  1). 
i=O 
The ratio  of real  dividends  over period  t to the real  stock price  at time 
t is D(t)IP(t). While P(t) is known at time t, D(t) is not; this is why the 
first  term  is the expected dividend-price  ratio  over period  t as of time t. 
The term  gd(t)  denotes the growth  rate of dividends  in period  t, defined 
as the ratio  of real  dividends  in period  t to real  dividends  in period  t -  1, 
minus one. Agd(t) is the "long-run  growth  rate of dividends,"  given by 
the annuity  value of the growth  rate  of future  dividends.  The parameters 
g and  r are the mean  rates of growth  of real  dividends  and  the mean  real 
rate  of return  on stocks, respectively. 
The equation  is a dynamic  extension  of Gordon's  formula,  which  was 
initially  derived  for the case of constant  dividend  growth.5  It is useful, 
4. The Livingston  survey  gives, for the United  States, a median  forecast  of the one- 
year  rate  of change  of the S&P  index  for  each year  since 1957.  These  forecasts  are  typically 
very high,  with  a mean  value  of about  22 percent  in the 1970s.  They steadily  decline  in the 
1980s,  from  21 percent  in 1979  to 1 percent  in 1990.  Taken  at face value, these reinforce 
the case that  the equity  premium  decreased  drastically  in the 1980s.  But  I doubt  that  these 
numbers  capture  the expectations  of actual  investors  in the stock market. 
5. Gordon  (1962). Olivier J. Blanchard  81 
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the United Kingdom,  France,  Italy, Japan, and Germany. 
for later  use, to sketch its derivation.  Denote the one-year  realized  rate 
of return  on stocks over period  t by RI (t). Then, by definition, 
(5)  1 + RI(t)  =  [D(t) +  P(t  +  1)]IP(t). 
Solving recursively  forward,  assuming  that the dividend-price  ratio 
does not explode, gives P(t) as the present discounted  value of future 
dividends,  discounted  by the sequence  of n-year  realized  rates  of return. 
Dividing  both sides by D(t), taking  expectations  conditional  on informa- 
tion at time t, and  linearizing,  gives equation  3, with  ERs(t)  defined  as 
(6)  ERs(t)  [(r -  g)I(1 +  r)] E  [(1 +  g)I(1 +  r)]iER' (t  +  i). 
i=O 
ERs(t)  is thus a weighted  average-more precisely, the annuity  value- 
of current  and  expected future  one-period  real  rates of return  on stocks. 
In this section, I shall  not attempt  to construct  series for ED/P or for 
EAgd,  leaving this to later sections where I can use longer time series 
and  appropriate  time-series  techniques.  But even an informal  examina- 
tion of the data  yields clear  conclusions. 
Figure  3 gives the evolution of the world dividend  yield since 1978. 
The method of construction  parallels  that used for interest rates. The 
world  dividend  yield is a weighted  average  of dividend  yields in the ma- 
jor stock  market  of each of the six countries.  The dividend  yields in each 
country  are  yearly  averages.  The weights  are, for  consistency  with  inter- 
est rates, relative  GDP weights; using relative stock market  capitaliza- 82  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 4.  Growth of World Real Dividends per Share,  1978-92 
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Source: Author's  calculations  based  on OECD  Financial  Statistics. 
tions leads to weights that are not very different.  To give a sense of the 
heterogeneity  of experiences across countries, the figure  presents two 
bands, corresponding  to the highest  and the lowest dividend  yields for 
each year. Sources and dividend  yields for each year and each country 
are given in appendix  table  A3. 
The main characteristic  of the figure  is quite striking.  From 1978  to 
1982,  the dividend  yield increased  slightly,  from  4.4 percent  to 5.0 per- 
cent. But from 1982  to 1992,  it has declined  from 5.0 percent  to 2.8 per- 
cent. Put another  way, since 1982,  while real dividends  have increased 
by 34 percent, real stock prices have increased  by close to 91 percent. 
One may worry  that this reflects  the evolution  of one or two markets- 
in particular,  the gyrations  of the Japanese  market.6  This is not the case. 
The decline  is strong  in all countries,  with  the exception  of Italy  (Milan), 
where the dividend  yield has increased.  This similarity  shows up in the 
fact that the bands have remained  roughly  parallel  to the mean since 
1982. 
The next question is whether  the decrease in the dividend  yield has 
been offset by expectations  of higher  long-run  dividend  growth:  that is, 
of a higher  value of EAgd. Figure  4 plots the evolution of gd, the annual 
growth  rate  of world  real  dividends  per share  from 1978  to 1992.  It shows 
6. For a discussion  of the evolution  of dividends,  earnings,  and prices in Japan,  see 
French  and  Poterba  (1991). Olivier J. Blanchard  83 
large  movements  in the growth  rate that closely follow the evolution of 
world  output  during  the period.  Dividend  growth  is negative  in the early 
1980s, reflecting  the world recession; high in the mid-1980s,  reflecting 
the world  expansion;  and low again  in the early 1990s.  Can  movements 
in expected long-run  dividend  growth  explain  the different  evolution of 
real bond rates and dividend  yields over the period?  At this point, it is 
useful to carry  out a simple  algebraic  exercise. 
For  purposes  of computation,  define  the equity  premium  as the differ- 
ence between  the expected rate  of return  on stocks and  the expected rate 
of return  on medium-term  bonds. From the definitions  of ERs  and ER' 
above, the equity  premium  is thus given by 
(7)  EX  (ERS - ER5) =  (ED/P  +  EAgd)-ER5 
Thus, over any period  of time, the change  in the premium  is given by 
(8)  AEX =  A(EDIP) +  A(EAgd)  -  A(ER5). 
Leaving  aside for the moment  the last few years, consider  the 1980s. 
In 1980,  the world  medium-term  real  bond  rate  was equal  to 2.0 percent; 
in 1990, it stood at 4.8 percent. In 1980, the world dividend  yield was 
equal  to 4.7 percent;  in 1990,  it stood at 2.8 percent. Thus, to argue  that 
there  was no change  in the equity  premium,  one must  argue  that  the un- 
derlying  expected rate of growth  of real dividends  was roughly  4.7 per- 
cent higher  in 1990  than  in 1980.  Is this reasonable? 
The answer  is clearly  no. A simple  approach  here  is to think  about  the 
underlying  determinants  of dividend growth, the ratio of dividends to 
earnings,  and  the growth  rate  of earnings.  The world  pay-out  ratio-the 
ratio of dividends to earnings-has  hovered between 0.4 and 0.5, but 
shows no trend over the last twenty years. And, while the share of 
profits  increased  in the 1980s,  no further  large  changes  are  forecast.7  The 
working  assumption  must  be that  profits  will  grow  at the same  rate  as the 
7. A partial  mea  culpa  is needed  here. Writing  in the early 1980s  with  Lawrence  Sum- 
mers  (Blanchard  and Summers,  1984),  we suggested  that  part  of the divergence  between 
dividend  yields and real bond rates may come from anticipations  of higher  profit  rates. 
Indeed,  there  was an increase  in profit  rates,  and  thus  a transitory  increase  in  growth  rates 
of real  profits,  in the 1980s.  Whatever  the merits  of the hypothesis  then, they have largely 
disappeared.  There  is little  reason  to expect a further  large  increase  in the share  of profits, 
and  dividend  yields  have not returned  to their  previous  values. 84  Br-ookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
economy. Here, as is well known, trend growth appears to have de- 
creased, not increased.8  Putting  things  together, it is very unlikely  that 
expected  dividend  growth  in 1990  was much  higher  than  it was ten years 
earlier.  Thus, it seems difficult  to avoid the conclusion  that there was a 
sharp  decrease  in the equity  premium  in the 1980s.9 
What  about the 1990s?  Dividend  yields have remained  roughly  con- 
stant since 1990, but medium-term  real rates have declined, from 4.9 
percent  in 1991  to 3.5 percent  in early 1993.  They have  further  decreased 
over the course  of 1993.  These numbers  suggest  that  the equity  premium 
has increased,  but not to its 1980  level. I return  to this issue later. 
U.S. Bond and Stock Returns since 1927 
The decrease  in the premium  in the 1980s  must  be placed  in historical 
perspective. Was the equity premium  in early 1980  unusually  high to 
start  with? How unusual  is a low premium?  To gain historical  perspec- 
tive, I turn  to longer  data. Ibbotson  and  associates have put together  an 
appropriate  data set for the United States since 1927.  I shall  rely on it.  '0 
8. Ned Phelps  has suggested  to me that  this  view may  be too provincial.  Multinational 
companies  operate  in a number  of markets  where  growth  may  be expected  to be high,  from 
Asia to Mexico-perhaps even to eastern  Europe.  This  suggests  dividing  firms  in the stock 
market  between  those with  such  operations  and  those without,  and  looking  for systematic 
differences  in dividend  yields. I have not done so. 
9. The conclusion  that the expected rate of return  on stocks went down in the 1980s 
may strike  some readers  as hard  to reconcile  with the fact that the 1980s  were a time of 
booming  stock markets  and large  realized  capital  gains. The key to reconciling  both sets 
of facts is that  I am  looking  at ex ante, or expected,  rates  of return,  whereas  the statement 
refers  to ex post, or realized,  rates  of return.  What  I am arguing,  in effect, is that  most of 
those capital  gains  were indeed  unexpected.  A similar  argument  is developed  by Malkiel 
(1990,  p. 332),  who also concludes  that  "at  the end of the 1980's,  bonds  appeared  to offer 
return  possibilities  almost  as attractive  as stocks, but  with less risk." 
10. An even longer  data  set, going  back  to the beginning  of the nineteenth  century,  has 
been  constructed  by Jeremy  Siegel  (1  992a, 1992b).  The  trade-off  between  the two data  sets 
is between  the length  of the time series and  the amount  of change  in the structure  of mar- 
kets. I was reluctant  to use nineteenth  century  data,  but  I shall  mention  basic  results  from 
Siegel when relevant.  Mullins  and Wadhwani  (1989)  look at closely related  issues using 
three  centuries  of U.K. data.  But  the  quality  of the  data-in particular,  the  use of averages, 
and imprecise  timing-prevents me from using them for the type of econometrics  I do 
below. Olivier  J. Blanchard  85 
Medium-Term and Long-Term Real Bond Rates 
I consider  two types of bonds: medium-term  bonds, with a maturity 
of five years;  and  long-term  bonds, with  a maturity  of twenty  years. Both 
are from Ibbotson and are available  annually  for 1927-93. The corre- 
sponding  five-year  and twenty-year  real rates are given, as before, by 
equation 1, with n =  5 and n =  20. In both cases,  I construct expected 
annuity  values of inflation  as follows. 
I first  construct  the ex post, realized  annuity  value A-rr"(t),  using the 
definition  in equation 2. Inflation  in year t, x,,  is constructed as the 
change  in the Consumer  Price Index (CPI)  from  December  of year t -  1 
to December  of year t. Constructing  A-rr"(t)  requires  two assumptions. 
The first  is the choice of the discount  rate, 8. Because the nominal  rate 
moves so much  during  that period,  the appropriate  discount  factor var- 
ies from  a value  close to zero during  World  War  II to a value  close to 0.13 
in the 1970s.  I use 8 = 0.10. Results  below are not sensitive to values of 
8 between 0.0 and 0.10. The second assumption  comes from the fact 
that, to construct  A-rn  for the last n -  1 years of the sample,  an assump- 
tion is needed  for the value of  r(t)  after  the end of the sample.  I assume 
that  inflation  in 1993  and  beyond  will equal  its 1992  value;  this seems rea- 
sonable  and  consistent  with current  forecasts. The results  below are not 
sensitive to reasonable  choices of this terminal  value. 
I then regress  AUrn  (t) on information  available  at time t and construct 
EA,rn(t) as the fitted  value. Because only part  of the information  set can 
be included  in the regression,  the resulting  estimated  series is not equal 
to the true  expectation-even  under  rational  expectations-but  the dif- 
ference between the two is uncorrelated  with the variables  included  in 
the regression.  I  I 
A choice must be made  about which variables  to include. Two obvi- 
ous variables  are lagged inflation,  and lagged nominal  rates, which are 
likely to contain  information  about current  and future  inflation,  or may 
affect inflation  causally. Because I look at stock returns  later, I include 
11. Under  some hypotheses,  the asset prices  may  be sufficient  statistics  for the infor- 
mation  available  to investors.  Under  the hypothesis  that  the real  rate  of return  on bonds  is 
constant,  nominal  rates  are  a sufficient  statistic  for information  about  future  inflation.  But 
these hypotheses,  as will be clear  in this paper,  are strongly  rejected.  For further  discus- 
sion, see Campbell  and  Shiller  (1987). 86  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
two other  variables,  the dividend  yield and  the lagged  real  rate  of capital 
gain  on stocks. 
The exact regressions  are as follows. The left-hand-side  variables  are 
either Awr5(t)  for five-year bonds or ArTr20(t)  for twenty-year  bonds. The 
right-hand-side  variables, which are known at the beginning  of year t, 
are: 
-r(t -  1), the rate of inflation for year t -  1, defined as the December 
CPI for year t -  1 divided by the December  CPI for year t -  2, minus 
one. 
Either I5(t) or FO(t),  as the case may be, defined as the nominal yields 
at the beginning  of year t, constructed  as the end of December  t -  1 val- 
ues of those nominal  yields. 
D(t  -  l)IP(t  -  1), the dividend yield for year t -  1, defined as real 
dividends  over year t -  1, divided by the real stock price index at the 
beginning of year t  -  1. Real dividends,  D(t-  1), are constructed  as 
nominal  dividends  paid  over year t -  1, deflated  by the average  CPI  for 
year t -  1. The real stock price, P(t  -  1) is constructed as the nominal 
stock price at the end of year t -  2, deflated  by the December  CPI for 
year t -  2. 
gp(t -  1), the rate of real capital gain over year t -  1, constructed as 
P(t)IP(t -  1) -  1. 
As has been documented  by many, including  Robert  B. Barsky, the 
inflation  process has not been stable over the period 1927-93;  there is 
substantially  more persistence now than there was earlier.  12 This sub- 
sample  instability  cannot  be ignored  and turns  out to be important  for a 
number  of results below. To deal with it, I use rolling regressions.'3 
Thus, to estimate EAar'2(t),  I use the fitted value from a regression  of 
As"  n(t) on the four variables  over the sample  composed of the previous 
forty observations, t -  39 to t. More specifically, the fitted values of 
A-rrn(t)  for t =  1929  to 1968  are obtained  from  a regression  run  from 1929 
to 1968. Thereafter Awrr"(t)  is obtained from regressions over t -  39 to t, 
for t =  1969  to 1993. 
12. Barsky  (1987). 
13. Rolling  regressions  may not be appropriate  if the inflation  process  changes  drasti- 
cally but  infrequently.  For evidence  on the inflation  process  along  these lines, see Evans 
and Lewis (1993). Olivier J. Blanchard  87 
Table 1.  Regressions of Inflation, Five-Year Horizonsa 
Independent  variableb 
Real  Nominal 
capital  five- 
Dividend  gain  year  Inflation 
Period  Equation  yield  rate  yield  rate 
1929-93  1-1  ...  ...  ...  0.47  0.32 
(3.7) 
[0.0] 
1-2  ...  ...  0.01  0.47  0.31 
(0. 1)  (3.3) 
[0.0] 
1-3  -  0.27  0.00  -0.03  0.48  0.29 
(-0.8)  (0.7)  (-0.2)  (3.5) 
[0.0] 
1954-93  1-4  ...  ...  ...  0.55  0.37 
(2.8) 
[0.0] 
1-5  ...  ...  -0.32  0.80  0.40 
(-1.3)  (3.2) 
[0.0] 
1-6  -0.98  0.04  -0.33  0.96  0.42 
1-  19)  (1.8)  (-1.6)  (3.5) 
[0.0] 
Source: Author's  regressions  based  on data  from  lbbotson  Associates  (1992)  and U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics, 
Consumer  Price  Index. 
a. The dependent  variable,  An5, is the realized  value  of inflation  over the next  five years,  as described  in the text. 
Numbers  in parentheses  are f-statistics  associated  with  the null  hypothesis  that  the coefficient  or sum  of coefficients 
is zero. Numbers  in brackets  show the significance  level of the test that  the set of coefficients  is equal  to zero. The 
second  moments  are Newey-West  corrected. 
b. The  dividend  yield  and  the real  capital  gain  rate  are lagged  once. Inflation  is entered  with  three  lags;  the number 
reported  for inflation  is the sum  of the coefficients. 
To conserve on degrees of freedom, I allow for only one lag of each 
variable,  except inflation,  which I allow for three lags. I allow for more 
lags on inflation  not because they are needed, but because I want to fo- 
cus later  on the dynamic  effects of inflation.  All the results emphasized 
below are robust  to the inclusion  of more  lags on the other  variables. 
Tables l and  2 summarize  the regression  results  for  Ar5 and  A 2r20,  re- 
spectively.  The  results  are  reported  for  the whole sample  (which  is never 
used to construct  the EAs but summarizes  the information  in a conve- 
nient way) and for the last rolling sample used, 1954-93. As a way of 
summarizing  information,  the tables also present regressions that in- 88  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table 2.  Regressions of Inflation, Twenty-Year Horizonsa 
Independent  variableb 
Real  Nominal 
capital  twenty- 
Dividend  gain  year  Inflation 
Per-iod  Equation  yield  rate  yield  rate  R2 
1929-93  2-1  ...  ...  ...  0.17  0.10 
(2.2) 
[0.12] 
2-2  ...  ...  0.10  0.13  0.11 
(0.7)  (1.3) 
[0.12] 
2-3  -0.57  0.01  0.01  0.15  0.22 
(-2.1)  (1.1)  (0.2)  (1.7) 
[0.10] 
1954-93  2-4  ...  ...  ...  0.17  0.09 
(2.3) 
[0.00] 
2-5  ...  ...  -0.28  0.40  0.17 
(-1.5)  (4.8) 
[0.00] 
2-6  -1.06  0.02  -0.27  0.53  0.46 
(2.3)  (1.4)  (3.1)  (5.1) 
[0.00] 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  The dependent  variable, An20,  is the realized value of inflation over the next twenty  years,  as described  in the 
text.  Numbers  in  parentheses  are  t-statistics  associated  with  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficient  or  sum  of 
coefficients  is zero.  Numbers  in brackets  show  the significance  level  of the test  that the set of coefficients  is equal 
to zero.  The second  moments are Newey-West  corrected. 
b.  The dividend yield and the real capital gain rate are lagged once.  Inflation is entered with three lags; the number 
reported for inflation is the sum of the coefficients. 
clude  only a subset  of the  four  variables.  While  none  of these regressions 
has a structural  interpretation,  they have three  interesting  features. 
The first is the set of coefficients  on past inflation  in the regressions 
that  include  only past inflation.  While  the sum  of coefficients  on past in- 
flation  tends to be higher  at the end of the sample,  it is substantially  be- 
low one. Using the whole sample  regressions,  an increase  of 1 percent 
in past inflation  leads to a revision  of A-r5  of 0.47 percent, and  of AMr20  of 
only 0.17 percent. 
The second interesting  feature is the coefficient  on nominal  rates in 
the regressions  that  include  only past inflation  and  nominal  rates. Under Olivier J. Blanchard  89 
the hypothesis that the real rate is constant, the coefficient should be 
equal  to one. But the coefficient  is small, positive, and insignificant  for 
the whole sample, and negative and marginally  significant  for the later 
part  of the sample.  14 This suggests  large  movements  in the real  rate, and/ 
or a systematic  effect of inflation  on real  rates. 
The third  feature  of interest  is the coefficient  of the dividend  yield in 
the  full  regressions.  Suppose  that  the stock market  has  more  information 
about  future  inflation  than  just past inflation,  and that anticipated  infla- 
tion decreases prices given current  dividends;  one would then expect 
the  coefficient  of the dividend  yield  to be positive. It is in  fact  negative  and 
usually  significant,  even if other  variables  are  included  in the regression. 
The fitted  values of expected inflation  from  regressions  1-3  and  2-3 of 
tables 1 and 2, and implied  real medium-term  and long-term  rates are 
given in figures  5 to 8. The fitted values of Ar5 and  AMr20  are shown to- 
gether  with actual  inflation  in figure  5. Actual inflation  has two peaks in 
the 1940s-one  during World War II, and one afterwards-and two 
peaks in the 1970s,  corresponding  to the two oil shocks. The two series 
for expected inflation  smooth those peaks substantially.  In 1980, with 
inflation  at 12.5 percent, Ar5  stands at 9.7 percent-nicely  fitting  the 
value  of 9.8 percent  obtained  from  DRI forecasts, and  used in the previ- 
ous section-and  AMr20  stands  at 6.8 percent. 
Figures  6 and  7 give the nominal  yields and  expected inflation  for five- 
year and twenty-year  bonds, respectively. The general  characteristics 
are familiar.  Note how five-year  yields do not reflect  the increase  in in- 
flation,  actual  and  expected, during  the war;  how low real  five-year  rates 
become in the 1970s;  and how large  they are in the 1980s.  The implied 
five-year  real rates after 1978  are close to those derived  in the first sec- 
tion using DRI forecasts and given in appendix  table Al.  The picture 
given in figure  7 is quite  similar,  although  with real  rates  remaining  more 
positive in the 1970s. 
Figure  8 plots the implied  five-year  and twenty-year  real rates. The 
basic  features  are the negative  real rates  from  the mid-1930s  to the mid- 
1950s,  the low rates again  in the 1970s,  the high rates in the 1980s,  and 
their  sharp  decline again  in the 1990s. 
14. This specific  subsample  instability  has been the topic of many  papers.  In a paper 
based  on a postwar  subsample,  Fama  (1975)  found  a coefficient  of close to one in a regres- 
sion  of inflation  on the short-term  nominal  rate.  Later  research  has shown  this result  to be 
sample-specific. 90  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
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Real Rates  of Return on Stocks 
In constructing  expected real rates of return  on stocks, I start  by fol- 
lowing the same strategy  as in the previous section, that of focusing on 
the expected rate of return  from holding  stocks forever. The approach 
to constructing  ER, is conceptually similar to that used for bonds, 
namely  the construction  of actual  values  for  DIP and  Agd  based  on equa- 
tion 3, and projection  of those series on an information  set to construct 
proxies  for expected values. 
I first construct the realized value of Agd(t),  the annuity value of 
future growth rates of real dividends per share, where gd(t)  is con- 
structed  as the ratio of real dividends  D(t) in year t to real dividends  in 
year  t -  1, minus  one. To construct  the required  discount  rate, I use the Olivier J. Blanchard  91 
Figure  6. Five-Year  Nominal  Interest  and Expected  Inflation  Rates, 1927-93 
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Source:  Basedi on predicted values from equation  1-3 in table  I and the five-year bond yield from Ibbotson (1992). 
sample  means as estimates of g and r, namely 1.2 percent and 8.5 per- 
cent, which together  imply a discount rate of 6.7 percent. As Agd  is an 
infinite  sum  into the future,  an assumption  is needed  for gd  beyond 1992. 
I assume gd to be equal to its sample average-namely,  1.2 percent- 
from 1993  forward.  15  Again,  results  below are  not sensitive to choices of 
the terminal  condition, within, approximately  2 percent of the value I 
have chosen.  16 
15. Choosing  the mean  over a more recent period  makes  little difference.  The mean 
value  of  gd  iS  1.3 percent  for 1954-92  and 1.3 percent  for 1980-92. 
16. Implications  of the choice of a terminal  condition  were discussed  at length  in the 
context of Robert  Shiller's  construction  of ex post prices in the stock market  (Shiller, 
1981).  There  is a close relation  between  Shiller's  approach  and  that  followed  here. Shiller 
discounted  future  dividends  at a constant  rate and looked at the resulting  price series in 
relation  to actual  prices. Instead,  I compute  the rate  of return  that  makes  the actual  price 
consistent  with  the expected  sequence  of dividends. 92  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Acdtivity,  2:1993 
Figure 7.  Twenty-Year Nominal Interest and Expected Inflation Rates,  1927-93 
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Source:  Based  on  predicted  values  from equation  2-3 in table 2 and the  twenty-year  bond  yield  from Ibbotson 
(1992). 
I then regress  both  DIP and  Agd  on the same four variables  I used for 
bonds earlier.  17 There  is less evidence of subsample  instability  as for in- 
flation  earlier;  however, for symmetry  with the treatment  of inflation,  I 
also use rolling  regressions  based on forty years. 
The results  of the regressions  are summarized  in table  3. Again,  these 
are reduced  forms, not easily interpretable.  But one result  is of interest. 
17. There  are  good reasons  to think  that  the dividend  payout  ratio  should  help  predict 
future  dividend  growth.  Other  things  being equal, a lower payout  should  lead to higher 
dividend  growth  later.  Thus, I also examined  regressions  including  the payout  ratio  as an 
additional  variable.  The coefficient  on the payout  ratio  is actually  positive, and usually 
significant  in most subsamples.  But it is quantitatively  small;  an increase  in the payout 
ratio  from  0.6 (the sample  average)  to 0.7 leads  to an increase  in expected  dividend  growth 
of 0.3 percent.  Including  it in regressions  makes  little  difference  to the estimated  series  for 
expected  dividend  growth  or the expected dividend  yield. For those two reasons,  and to 
conserve  on degrees  of freedom,  I did not include  it in the regressions. Olivier J. Blanchard  93 
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If most movements  in the dividend  yield reflected  changes  in the antici- 
pated rate of growth  of dividends, the coefficient  in a regression  of the 
realized  growth  of dividends  on the dividend  yield should  yield a nega- 
tive coefficient. Instead, the coefficient  on the lagged dividend  yield is 
positive and significant.  This is true in regressions  that include or ex- 
clude the other  regressors.  18 
The regressions  of both  DIP and  Agd in table 3 imply, therefore,  that 
a higher dividend yield leads to a higher expected rate of return on 
stocks, by leading  both to a higher  expected dividend  yield next year, 
18. A regression  of the annual  rate  of growth  of dividends,  g,  rather  than  the annuity 
value  Agd, yields  a negative  but  insignificant  coefficient  on the  lagged  dividend  yield,  a sign 
consistent  with  the findings  in Campbell  and Shiller  (1989,  table  4). Thus,  given the other 
variables  in the regression,  a higher  dividend-price  ratio  predicts  slower  dividend  growth 
in the short  run,  but  higher  dividend  growth  over the long  run. 94  Brookings Papers  on  Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table  3. Regressions  of the Growth  Rate of Future  Dividends  and of the Dividend  Yielda 
Independent  variableb 
Nominal 
Real  twenty- 
Dependent  Dividend  capital  year  Inflation 
variable  Period  yield  gain  rate  yield  rate  R2 
Annuity  1929-93  0.42  -0.007  -0.05  0.09  0.25 
value of  (3.9)  (-1.1)  (-1.0)  (2.4) 
growth  rate  [0.04] 
of real 
1954-93  0.50  -0.014  0.07  -0.07  0.34 
dividends 
(3.9)  (-1.8)  (1.4)  (-1.3) 
[0.30] 
Dividend  1929-93  0.86  -0.030  -0.05  0.03  0.85 
yield  (16.2)  (-9.5)  (-2.0)  (1.9) 
[0.03] 
1954-93  0.97  -0.038  0.00  -0.01  0.94 
(19.8)  (-13.1)  (0.2)  (-0.6) 
[0.02] 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics  associated  with the  null hypothesis  that the coefficients  or the sum of 
coefficients  is zero.  Numbers  in brackets  show  the significance  level  of the test  that the set of coefficients  is equal 
to zero.  The second  moments are Newey-West  corrected. 
b.  The dividend yield and the real capital gain rate are lagged once.  Inflation is entered with three lags; the number 
reported for inflation is the sum of the coefficients. 
the first term in equation  3, and to a higher  expected rate of growth  of 
dividends,  the second term  in that  equation.  '9 
The expected rate of return  on stocks implied  by those regressions  is 
plotted  in figure  9, which plots both  E(D/P) and  ER, -E(D/P)  +  EAgd. 
The dividend  yield shows a steady decrease since the early 1950s,  with 
a bulge  in the late 1970s  and  early 1980s.  It is now back  at its level of the 
early 1970s.  Because EAgd is estimated  to be positively related  to DIP, 
the implied  real rate of return  on stocks moves with the dividend  yield, 
but  with  larger  amplitude.  It also shows a steady  decline  since 1950,  with 
a bulge  in the mid-  1970s  and  early 1980s. 
The Evolution of the Equity Premium since 1927 
Having  constructed  series for ER5, ER20,  and  ERR,  I can now look at 
the equity premiums,  defined either as EX5  ER, -  ERs or EX20 
19. This finding  is related  to the findings  that  the dividend  yield predicts  higher  n-pe- 
riod  rates  of return  on stocks, a relation  to which  I return  in the next section. Olivier J. Blanchard  95 
Figure 9.  Expected Dividend Yield and Rate of Return on Stocks,  1929-93 
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Source:  Author's  calculations  based on first and third regressions  in table 3. 
ERs -  ER20.  While  the second definition  is better  in the sense of having 
closer durations  of bonds  and stocks, I also look at the first  because I am 
more  confident  of the expected inflation  measures  over five years than 
over twenty  years. 
Figure  10  plots the two expected real  rates on bonds, ER5, ER20,  and 
the expected real  rate  on stocks, ERs.  What  is most striking  in the figure 
is how different  the movements  of expected rates  of return  on bonds  and 
stocks  have been over the last sixty-five  years. Indeed,  the main  impres- 
sion is one of expected returns  moving  in opposite directions.  From  the 
mid-1930s  to the mid-1950s,  expected  rates  of return  on stocks were high 
while  expected  rates  of return  on medium-term  or long-term  bonds  were 
low and  often negative.  The same is again  true  in the 1970s,  although  to 
a lesser extent. In contrast,  the 1960s,  and even more so, the 1980s,  are 
characterized  by relatively  high expected bond rates and low expected 
stock rates  of return. 96  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 10.  Expected Real Rates of Return for Stocks, Five-Year Bonds, 
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Figure  11I  plots the two premiums:  EAT5  and  EX20.  The rest  of the paper 
will focus on their  evolution. But before  that, as a check of robustness, 
I present  an alternative  construction. 
Realized  Excess  Returns and the Equity Premium 
An alternative  to the construction  of the equity premium  used so far 
is to compute the realized excess rate of return  on stocks over bonds 
over some holding  period, project  it on information  available  as of the 
beginning  of the holding  period,  and  look at the evolution  of that  projec- 
tion over time. This is what I now do. 
I define  the realized  equity premium  from  holding  stocks over bonds 
over twenty years as 
(9)  R20 (t)  -  R20 (t), Olivier J. Blanchard  97 
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(11)  Rj%20  (t)  71  [1 + RIB  (t +  i)]1/20  -  1. 
i=0 
Note that the realized return  on stocks includes actual dividends and 
capital  gains  that occur over the holding  period.  The realized  rate of re- 
turn  from  holding  three-month  T-bills  over year  t is RTB(t).  I compute  the 
realized  return  on bonds from a strategy  of rolling  T-bills, rather  than 
holding  a twenty-year  bond. I do this for comparability  with other stud- 
ies in finance,  which have traditionally  considered  that strategy. 98  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table 4.  Regressions of Equity Premiumsa 
Independent  variableb 
Real  Nominal 
capital  tiwenty- 
Dependent  Dividend  gain  year  Inflation 
variable  Period  yield  rate  yield  rate  R2 
Alternative  1929-73  1.31  -0.06  -1.44  0.11  0.59 
realized  (1.8)  (-3.4)  (-2.1)  (0.8) 
premiumc  [0.20] 
1954-73  0.92  -0.03  -0.74  0.90  0.49 
(5.0)  (-3.1)  (-3.5)  (5.6) 
[0.00] 
Measure  1929-73  0.83  -0.03  -0.83  0.27  0.52 
from tables  (2.3)  (-3.1)  (-2.5)  (2.5) 
1-3  3d  [0.00] 
1954-73  0.47  -0.03  -0.41  0.10  0.76 
(2.1)  (-3.5)  (-2.3)  (0.7) 
[0.00] 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  The  period of estimation  ends  in  1973 for the first two  regressions,  as this is the last year  when  the  realized 
premium can be computed.  For comparison's  sake, the same periods are used for the other two regressions.  Numbers 
in parentheses  are t-statistics  associated  with the null hypothesis  that the coefficient,  or sum of coefficients,  is zero. 
Numbers  in brackets  show  the significance level  of the test that the set of coefficients  is equal to zero.  The  second 
moments are Newey-West  corrected. 
b.  The dividend yield and the real capital gain rate are lagged once.  Inflation is entered with three lags; the number 
reported for inflation is the sum of the coefficients. 
c.  Defined  as  R20(t)-  R20(t), the  realized  rate of  return on  holding  stocks  for twenty  years  minus the  realized 
rate of return from rolling treasury bills for twenty  years. 
d.  Defined as [D/P(t)  +  Agd (t)]  -  [120  (t)  -  An20(t)]. See  the text for further details. 
Having constructed  the realized premium  for 1927-73  (because the 
realized twenty-year  premium  from 1973  to 1992  is the last one avail- 
able), I then regress  it on the same  four variables  as before, using  forty- 
year rolling  regressions.  I use rolling  regressions  for samples  starting  in 
1929  to samples starting  in 1954, so that the last regression  uses only 
twenty observations. 
A summary  of those regressions  is given in the top half  of table  4, for 
both the whole sample-which  again  is never used to construct  the ex- 
pected premium  but summarizes  the data-and  for the last rolling  sam- 
ple, 1954-73.  For comparison,  the bottom  half of the table gives the re- 
sults of regressions  using  the ex post value of X20  constructed  earlier  as 
the dependent  variable,  over the same time periods. Except for differ- 
ences in sample  periods, these last two regressions  are  just summaries Olivier  J. Blanchard  99 
of the regressions  of the different  components  presented  in the earlier 
three  tables.20 
The striking  feature  of the two regressions  using realized  returns  in 
the top half of table 4, which has been documented  and discussed at 
length elsewhere, is the strong  positive effect of the dividend  yield on 
the equity premium.21  The other, nearly  equally striking,  aspect of the 
two regressions  is the strong  negative  effect of the long nominal  rate.22 
The two sets of regressions,  using  the two alternative  equity  premiums, 
show rather  similar  coefficients. One relevant  difference  is the effect of 
past inflation  on the two premiums  for the sample 1954-73,  with a much 
stronger  effect on the first  than  on the second. However, the interpreta- 
tion of this finding  is not obvious, given the presence of the other vari- 
ables; I return  to that  issue in a later  section. 
The important  question  here is whether  the two estimated  premiums 
move together. Using the 1929-73 regressions, the predicted values 
from the rolling  regressions  are plotted in figure 12 through 1993. The 
top frame  reproduces  the evolution of the premium  (using  twenty-year 
bonds)  given in figure  11  and  the bottom  frame  gives the evolution  of my 
alternative  measure, the projection  of twenty-year  holding-period  ex- 
cess realized  return.  Each of the two panels also gives the one standard 
deviation band associated with the point estimates of the equity pre- 
mium  at each point in time (where the standard  deviations underlying 
the band  are  computed  taking  into account  the moving  average  structure 
of the residuals  in the equation).  The conclusions are simple. The two 
constructed  series move very much  in the same  way. The standard  devi- 
ation bands vary from 3 to 6 percent. While  large, they still show clear 
evolutions, to which I now turn. 
Trends and Inflation 
I draw  two main  conclusions  from the evolutions of the various  con- 
structed  premiums  in figures  11  and 12.  First, the premiums  display  clear 
20. The realized  value of the premium,  XA2,  is defined  as (DIP) + Agd -  I? + A'IT20. 
Tables  2 and  3 give the regressions  of A2rr'?,  DIP, and  Agd on the four  variables.  Given  that 
I20 is one of these  four  variables,  the regression  of FO  on those variables  is F0  itself. 
21. See, for example, Fama and French (1988)  and Cutler, Poterba,  and Summers 
(1990). 
22. I have  not explored  the effects of allowing  for rates  of different  maturities  as inde- 
pendent  variables.  Campbell  (1987)  shows that yield spreads  between  bonds  of different 
maturities  help  predict  monthly  returns  on stocks  in excess of the one-month  rate. 100  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure  12. Equity  Premiums,  1929-93a 
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low-frequency  movements,  a steady  increase  from  the early 1930s  to the 
mid-1940s,  and  a trend  decline since the early 1950s.  The premiums  rise 
from 3 to 5 percent  in the early 1930s,  peak at more than 10 percent in 
the late 1940s, and drop to 2 or 3 percent today. Current  values of the 
premiums  thus appear  to be roughly on trend. This can be put in the 
longer historical perspective with the data set provided by Jeremy 
Siegel, who constructs and examines a series for the equity premium 
since 1800.23  Rather than attempting  to construct a series for the ex- 
pected premium  as I have done here, Siegel uses a thirty-year  centered 
moving  average  of the ex post premium  as an estimate  of the ex ante  pre- 
mium.  After 1927,  his constructed  premium  has the same  general  evolu- 
tion as the one plotted  in figure  11. Before 1927,  the premium  is close to 
23. Siegel  (1992b). Olivier  J. Blanchard  101 
zero from 1800  to 1850,  a period  of high  real rates on bonds. It is rather 
stable from 1850  to the early 1930s, with a mean of about 4 percent. 
Thus, as Siegel emphasizes, the period  from the early 1930s  to the late 
1940s  appears  anomalous. 
Second, the premiums  in the figures  display  higher-frequency  move- 
ments; these appear  to be correlated  with movements  in inflation.  The 
postwar  decline in the premium  was temporarily  reversed  in the 1970s, 
a period  of sharply  higher  inflation.  This increase, in turn,  was reversed 
in the 1980s,  with a return  to trend or decline below it, when inflation 
was sharply  lower.24  The bulge of the 1970s  is substantially  smaller  for 
the twenty-year  premium  than  for the five-year  premium.  But  the evolu- 
tions of the two premiums  are otherwise  rather  similar. 
How close are movements in the premium  and in inflation?  A first 
rough  pass at the answer  is given in figure  13, which plots deviations  of 
the five-year  and twenty-year  premiums  and of inflation  from ten-year 
past  moving  averages  of themselves,  a flexible  way of removing  low- fre- 
quency components  in the series. The relation  clearly exists. The cor- 
responding  regressions  give 
(12)  EX5(t) =  -0.0045  + 0.40*r(t  -  1), 
(4.5) 
R2 =  0.26; Durbin-Watson  =  0.55; period: 1932-88; 
(t-statistic  in parentheses) 
and 
(13)  EX20(t)  =  -0.016  + 0.18 *- (t -1), 
(2.8) 
R2=  0.11; Durbin-Watson  =  0.35; period: 1932-88; 
(t-statistic  in parentheses) 
where EX5(t)  EX5(t) -  0.1  9?0 EX5(t  -  i) and similarly for EX20(t)  and 
*f(t).  The inflation  series is lagged  once, as nr(t  -  1)  is the most recent in- 
flation  rate  in the information  set at time t. When  the regressions  are  esti- 
mated  with  an  AR(1)  correction,  the coefficients  on inflation  are smaller: 
0.19 and 0.11, respectively.25  These results suggest that a decline in in- 
24. A similar  set of observations  is made  by Summers  (1983). 
25. These  regressions  are  merely  data  descriptions.  The series that  are  used are  fitted 
values  from  rolling  regressions,  minus  a moving  average  of themselves,  and  thus display 
strange  time-series  characteristics. 102  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Figure 13.  Deviations from the Ten-Year Moving Averages of the Five-Year 
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flation  of  I percent  decreases  the  equity  premium  initially  by  between 
0.1t and  0.4  percent.  The  effect  largely  disappears  over  time  (after  ten 
years,  for the particular  specification  used  here).  The  next  two  sections 
look at both characteristics,  the trend and the relation  to inflation,  in 
more  detail. 
Trend Movements and the Premium 
In explaining  low-frequency  movements  in the premium,  economet- 
rics cannot be of much use. Instead, one must look for variables  that 
have the same general time shape as the premium  and may plausibly 
have affected  it. Olivier  J. Blanchard  103 
This  approach  nevertheless  allows one to rule  out a number  of poten- 
tial factors, or at least to rule them out as major  explanatory  variables. 
One  such  factor  is government  debt. To the extent that  government  debt 
is perceived  as net wealth, an increase  in its relative  supply  should  lead 
to an increase in its relative rate of return,  and thus to a lower equity 
premium.  Thus, if the evolution  of government  debt had  been one of the 
main  determinants  of the premium,  they should  have moved  in opposite 
directions  in the sample.  The data  are  very much  at odds with this impli- 
cation. The 1940s  are associated  both with a large  buildup  of debt and a 
high premium.  Until the 1970s, the decline in the premium  from the 
1950s  on coincides with a steady decline in the debt-GDP  ratio. Only in 
the 1980s  does the relation  appear  to go the right  way. This general  im- 
pression is confirmed  by an econometric study by Paolo Mauro  based 
on panel data  from twenty countries since 1960,  which finds a positive 
association between debt-GDP  ratios and the equity premium.26  This 
route  does not appear  promising. 
Another  potential  cause is a change  in the relative  riskiness  of stocks 
and  bonds. Many  studies  have focused on the evolution  of various  mea- 
sures  of riskiness.  The evidence is summarized  in figure  14,  which plots 
the rolling  variance  of quarterly  stock returns  and  the rolling  covariance 
of quarterly  twenty-year  bond and stock returns  since 1928,  with each 
of the two moments  estimated  over twelve quarters.  There  is little evi- 
dence of trends in either. The striking  feature is the volatility of stock 
returns  in the late 1920s  and  early 1930s.  This fact suggests, however, a 
potential  explanation:  that  the unusually  high  equity  premium  of the late 
1930s  and 1940s  was in part  caused by the perception  of high volatility 
from the movements in the stock market  in the late 1920s and early 
1930s.27  Such  a perception,  the explanation  goes, led many  investors  not 
to invest in stocks at any price, but  to shift  instead  to government  securi- 
ties, generating  a high  equity  premium.28 
One  of the strengths  of this explanation  is that  it also explains  why the 
equity  premium  went steadily  down from  the early 1950s  on. As memo- 
26. Mauro  (1992). 
27. This  argument  is made  by Siegel  (1992b). 
28. Patriotism,  and the fact that previous  wars had been followed  by deflation,  may 
also explain  why people were willing  to hold bonds  during  World  War  II at what I have 
estimated,  with  the benefit  of hindsight,  to be negative  expected  real  rates.  But these fac- 
tors  do not  explain  why  the premium  remained  high  for  many  years  after  the wal, and  after 
the 1947  inflation. 104  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
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ries of the 1930s  faded, people slowly returned  to stocks, discovering 
what Rajnish  Mehra  and Edward  C. Prescott  later  established:  namely, 
that at equity premiums  prevailing  after World  War  II, holding stocks 
was very appealing.29  The point is often made  along  the following  lines: 
since 1927,  the realized  return  from  holding  stocks has exceeded that  of 
holding  bonds  over every single  twenty-year  period.30  Also, institutional 
investors have become increasingly  important.  Given their mandate, 
29. Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985). 
30. Computations  along those lines are given in MaCurdy  and Shoven (1992).  They 
should  be given with the warning  that  they may  be less impressive  than  they look. Over- 
lapping twenty-year realized rates of  return over the sample are not independent 
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one would  expect managers  of pension  funds  to think  in terms  of longer 
horizons  and  to act to take advantage  of an attractive  equity  premium.3' 
In the United States, the share  of equities held by pension funds (state 
and  local, and private)  has gone from about 1 percent  in 1950,  to 9 per- 
cent in 1970,  to 29 percent  today. In the United Kingdom,  the share  has 
gone from  6 percent  in 1963  to more  than  30 percent  today. These evolu- 
tions appear to  be  the  most  promising lead  to  explain the  low- 
frequency  movements  in the premium. 
Inflation  and the Premium 
If identifying  the causes of the low-frequency  movements  in the pre- 
mium  is difficult,  identifying  the reasons why inflation  affects the pre- 
mium  is even more so. A large body of research  has explored various 
mechanisms through which inflation  may affect the premium, either 
through  the interaction  between inflation  and taxation, inflation and 
risk, or inflation  and  money illusion.32  In this section, I will limit  my am- 
bitions  to improving  on the rough  estimates  of the observed  relation  be- 
tween inflation  and the premium  given earlier.  I shall  also relate  the re- 
sults to the equally large body of empirical  research  on the relation  of 
inflation  to bond  and stock returns. 
In the regressions  of the components  of the equity premium  summa- 
rized in tables 1 to 3, one of the variables  was lagged  inflation.  But the 
coefficients on inflation  were difficult  to interpret  because they pre- 
sented  only the effects of inflation  given the other  variables  in the regres- 
sion. The methodology, however, is easily extended to yield both the 
direct  and  the indirect  effects of inflation.  The idea  is to estimate  the  joint 
31. In the theory  of behavior  under  uncertainty  based  on loss aversion  and  mental  ac- 
counts  developed  by Kahneman  and Tversky  (1979)  and applied  by Benartzi  and  Thaler 
(1993)  to the equity  premium,  there is a strong  relation  between the horizon  over which 
investors  assess the results  of their  portfolio  and  the equilibrium  equity  premium.  In  figure 
3 of Benartzi  and  Thaler  (1993),  premiums  of 6 percent  correspond  to horizons  of less than 
one year,  while  premiums  of 2 to 3 percent  correspond  to horizons  of five to ten years. 
32. That investors  may be comparing  nominal  rates on bonds to dividend  yields for 
stocks was argued  by Modigliani  and Cohn (1979),  who predicted  that if inflation  came 
down,  the equity  premium  would  also decrease.  As is clear  from  the previous  figures,  their 
prediction  held  very well in the 1980s. 106  Brookings  Paper  s on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
process for the four variables  included  in the earlier  equations,  and  then 
use this, as well as the auxiliary  equations  for the annuity  values I esti- 
mated earlier, to trace the effects of an innovation  in inflation  on the 
components  of the premium. 
I implement  this as follows. Rather  than working  with the four-vari- 
able vector autoregression  (VAR) in the dividend  yield, the rate of real 
capital  gain on stocks, the nominal  bond rate, and inflation,  I use two 
separate  VARs:  one for nominal  rates  and  inflation,  and  one for dividend 
yields, the rate of capital  gain, and inflation.  I do this to deal with sub- 
sample  instability;  I prefer  to use rolling  samples  to capture  the change 
in the joint processes through  time, and using VARs with fewer vari- 
ables conserves on degrees of freedom. 
Using the first  VAR and  an auxiliary  equation  for the annuity  value of 
inflation,  I trace the effects of an innovation  in inflation  on nominal  and 
expected real  bond  rates. Using the second  and  an auxiliary  equation  for 
the annuity  value  of dividend  growth,  I trace  the effects of an innovation 
in inflation  on the expected rate of return  on stocks. Putting  the results 
together  gives the effects of an innovation  in inflation  on the premium.33 
Real Bond Rates  and Inflation 
To trace  the effects of inflation  on either  five-year  or twenty-year  real 
bond rates, I estimate  for each one the following  bivariate  system, 
(14)  I'1(t  +  1) =  a,1,T(t) +  aII(L)Tr(t  -  1) +  a121P(t) +  E1n(t) 
(15)  W(t)  =  a21(L)IT(t  -  1) +  a22In(t)  +  Es(t), 
and  the auxiliary  regression, 
(16)  AwT'l(t)  =  aol(L)7T(t  -  1)  + aO2I"(t) +  EA(t), 
33. The approach  followed  in this section  is closely related  to that  taken  by Campbell 
and  Ammer  (1992)  and  by Shiller  and Beltratti  (1992).  Both those papers  also use a VAR 
approach,  with  a similar  list of variables,  to characterize  the  joint movement  of stock and 
bond  returns.  They  differ  from  this  section  in both  minor  and  less minor  ways. Minor  ways 
include  the use of log-linear  rather  than  linear  approximations,  postwar  monthly  data (in 
Campbell  and Ammer),  a slightly  different  list of variables,  and different  assumptions 
about  the potential  presence  of unit roots. In contrast  to my paper,  Shiller  and Beltratti 
focus on tests of hypotheses,  including  that  of a constant  equity  premium.  Campbell  and 
Ammer  focus on explaining  realized  stock and bond  returns  as a function  of news about 
future  dividends,  inflation,  real  bond  rates,  and  the equity  premium. Olivier J. Blanchard  107 
where a1  I(L),  a21(L),  and ao1(L)  are lag polynomials  of order 3, and a11, 
a12,  a22,  and aO2  are scalars.  The choice of the order  of lags is, as before, 
determined  by considerations  of degrees of freedom;  the results below 
are also robust  to the presence of longer  lags on I". 
The slight awkwardness  of notation, with the two dependent  vari- 
ables being  In(t +  1) and wr(t),  comes from  the timing  conventions. The 
yield to maturity  at the beginning  of year t  +  1, or equivalently  at the 
end of year t, is P'1(t  +  1). Inflation during year t is ir(t). 
I estimate  the VAR, and  the auxiliary  equation  for expected inflation, 
on rolling  samples  of forty years, from 1929-68  to 1953-92.  For the esti- 
mated system associated with each subsample,  I then trace the effects 
of a 1  percent  innovation  in e  in year  0 on I"(t), -r(t)  and  EAr r"(t), in years 
0 to m. In year  0, the innovation  in inflation  affects  only inflation,  as both 
the nominal  rate and the expected annuity  value of inflation  are mea- 
sured  as of the beginning  of the year. From  year 1 on, nominal  rates, in- 
flation,  and  expected inflation  are  all affected  by the shock to inflation  in 
year  0. 
The purpose  of computing  these impulse  responses is to capture  the 
dynamic  effects of a shock to inflation  at time t on future  expected infla- 
tion and expected real rates. The limitations  of the exercise come from 
the nature  of VARs and impulse  responses;  it is worth  making  them ex- 
plicit. 
The first is the implicit identification  condition in the VAR, which 
takes the form of the presence of wT(t)  in the first equation, but not of In(t 
+  1) in the second equation.  The assumption  implicit  in that specifica- 
tion is that  the correlation  between innovations  in inflation  in year t and 
innovations  in the nominal  rate  from  the beginning  of year t to the begin- 
ning  of year t +  1 reflects  the effects of unexpected  inflation  on nominal 
rates, not the reverse. 
The second limitation  comes from the specification  of the VAR in 
only two variables, nominal  rates and inflation.  Thus, the dynamic  ef- 
fects captured  in the impulse  responses  below reflect  not  only the effects 
of inflation  per se, but also of all the variables  that move with inflation 
and  are not included  in the regression. 
The third  limitation  is that nominal  rates may be in part  "information 
variables,"  variables  embodying  information  about future  inflation  not 
contained  in current  and  past inflation.  Thus, some of the changes  in in- 
flation  will appear  as innovations  in yields rather  than  in inflation.  Thus, 108  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
Table 5.  Dynamic Effects of a 1 Percentage Point Innovation in Inflation on the Real 
Rate of Return on Five-year Bondsa 
Percentage points 
Nominal  Expected  Expected 
five-year  inflationb  real 
Sample  Period  Inflation  yield  (five-year)  returnc 
1929-68  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.56e  0.01  O. 9d  -0.17d 
2  0.10  0.02  0.05  -0.04 
3  -0.10  0.04  0.09  -0.05 
1939-78  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.54e  0.03  0.25e  -0.22e 
2  0.00  0.-5d  0.13d  -0.08 
3  -0.11  0.04  0.20d  -0.16d 
1949-88  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.90e  0.24e  0.43e  -O,1  d 
2  0.36e  0.35e  0.33e  0.02 
3  0.11  0.35e  0.23d  0.11 
1953-92  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  1.06e  0.31e  0.59e  - 0.27d 
2  0.59e  0.44e  0.36e  0.08 
3  0.32d  0.40e  0.38e  0.03 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  The responses  are obtained by simulation of a dynamic  system,  estimated  in each case  over the sample period 
indicated in the first column, in (15, ir) and an auxiliary equation for A7r5.  The numbers are responses  to an unexpected 
movement  in inflation of  I percentage  point in period 0. 
b.  Expected  inflation, EA7r5,  is for a five-year  horizon. 
c.  Expected  real rate of return on five-year  bonds,  defined as ER5 in the text. 
d.  t-statistic  between  I and 2. 
e.  t-statistic greater than 2. 
the impulse  responses below capture  only the dynamic  effects of those 
innovations  in inflation  that  were not anticipated  by the bond  market. 
The results of the dynamic  effects of an inflation  innovation  on five- 
year  and  twenty-year  nominal  and  real  bond  rates are summarized  in ta- 
bles 5 and  6. A different  set of impulse  responses  is associated  with each 
rolling  regression.  The tables  present  impulse  responses  for rolling  sam- 
ples ten years apart:  1929-68, 1939-78, 1949-88, and the latest sample 
available,  1953-92. 
Together,  the two tables  give a picture  in which  expected  inflation  has 
an effect of real rates, but an effect that disappears  after a couple of 
years. The effects of a 1 percentage  point innovation  in inflation  during 
year  0 typically  leads to a decline in five-year  real  rates  of about  0.2 per- 
cent at the beginning  of year 1. The effect is largely  gone in year 2. The 
effects of a similar  innovation  leads to a decline  in twenty-year  real  rates Olivier J. Blanchard  109 
Table 6.  Dynamic Effects of a 1 Percentage Point Innovation in Inflation on the Real 
Rate of Return on Twenty-year Bondsa 
Percentage  Points 
Expected 
Nominal  inflationb  Expected 
twenty-  (twenty-  real 
Sample  Period  Inflation  year yield  year)  returnc 
1929-68  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.55e  0.02d  0.12d  - O.l  d 
2  0.07  0.04d  0.05  -0.01 
3  -0.14  0.06d  0.06  -0.01 
1939-78  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.52e  0.03d  0.03  0.00 
2  0.02  0.06d  -0.02  0.08 
3  -0.14  0.03  -0.03  0.06 
1949-88  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  0.90e  0.19ge  0.20d  -0.01 
2  0.35d  0.29e  0.17d  0.12d 
3  0.09  0.32e  0.02  0.30e 
1953-92  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
1  1.06e  0.24e  0.33e  -0.08 
2  0.60e  0.37e  0.189d  0.1le 
3  0.32d  0.38e  0.11  0.26e 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  The responses  are obtained by simulation of a dynamic  system,  estimated  in each case  over the sample period 
indicated  in  the  first column,  in  (120, ir) and  an  auxiliary  equation  for A7r20. The  numbers  are  responses  to  an 
unexpected  movement  in inflation of  I percentage  point in period 0. 
b.  Expected  inflation, EAOr20,  is for a twenty-year  horizon. 
c.  Expected  real rate of return on twenty-year  bonds,  defined as ER20 in the text. 
d.  t-statistic  between  I and 2. 
e.  t-statistic  greater than 2. 
of about  0.1 percent  at the beginning  of year 1. Again  the effect is largely 
gone in year 2. Thus, the Fisher  effect seems to hold after  only a couple 
of years.34 
I expected  the effect of inflation  on real  rates  to be stronger.  The  prox- 
imate source of the weak effect can be understood  from  the tables. For 
most of the sample,  an innovation  to inflation  has only a transitory  effect 
on inflation.  For the first  two rolling  samples,  the effect of an innovation 
on inflation  is gone after  two years. Only  in the postwar  sample  does in- 
flation  show substantial  persistence.35  Thus, while nominal  rates do not 
34. This  result  is robust  to a more  generous  specification  of the lag  structure. 
35. This fact casts doubt on the research  using cointegration  methods  to study the 
Fisher  effect. McCallum  (1984)  makes  a similar  point.  For  most  of the period  under  study, 
inflation  is clearly  a stationary  process. Moreover,  the more  recent  period-when a unit 
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respond  very much  to innovations  in inflation,  neither  do the expected 
values  of inflation  over the life of the five-year  and  especially  the twenty- 
year bonds. Thus, real rates do not move very much in response to an 
inflation  shock. 
Independent-and I think  better-evidence  can again  be obtained  for 
the recent past from the indexed bond market  in the United Kingdom. 
In combination  with the market  for nominal  bonds and the assumption 
of arbitrage,  it can be used to get direct  measures  of inflation  and study 
their relation to real rates. This has been done by Woodward  using 
monthly  data since 1982.36  His results are surprisingly  similar  to those 
presented  above. While he finds an effect of expected inflation  on real 
rates  for maturities  up to ten years (with  an effect of about - 0.3 percent 
on real  rates  for a 1.0 percentage  point  increase  in expected inflation  for 
maturities  around  five years), the data  are consistent  with a one-for-one 
effect of expected inflation  on nominal  rates for maturities  longer than 
ten years. 
Rates  of Return on Stocks  and Inflation 
To trace  the effects of inflation  on rates  of return  on stocks, I estimate 
the following  trivariate  system, 
(17)  (DIP)(t) =  bl1T(t) +  bil(L)wT(t  -  1) +  b]2(DIP)(t -  1) 
+  b13gp(t  -  1)  +  EDP(t), 
(18)  gp(t) =  b2l*r(t) +  b22(L)wT(t  -  1) +  b22(DIP)(t  -  1) 
+  b23gp(t  -  1)  +  Egp(t), 
(19)  r(t) =  b3l(L)IT(t  -  1) +  b32(DIP)(t  -  1) 
+  b33gp(t -  1) +  E(t), 
and  the auxiliary  regression, 
(20)  Agd(t)  =  boI(L)wT(t  -  1) +  bO2(DIP)(t  -  1) 
+  bO3gp(t  -  1)  +  EA(t), 
where the b1I  (L), b21(L),  b31(L),  bol (L) are lag polynomials of order 3. I 
then proceed in the same way as for bonds, estimating  rolling  samples, 
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Table 7.  Dynamic Effects of a 1 Percentage Point Innovation in Inflation on the Real 
Rate of Return on Stocksa 
Percentage points 
Expected 
growth  Real 
rate of  capital  Expected 
Dividend  fiuture  gain  real 
Sample  Period  Inflation  yield  dividendsb  rate  returnc 
1929-68  0  1.00  0.01  0.00  - 0.48  0.00 
1  0.63e  -  0.01  O.lle  0.35d  0.10 
2  0.21d  0.00  0.08d  0.02d  0.09 
3  0.02  0.04  0.04  0.36d  0.09 
1939-78  0  1.00  0.01  0.00  -3.01e  0.00 
1  0.55e  0.05d  0.09  -0.66  0.14e 
2  0.01  0.06d  0.12  0.55  0.19e 
3  -0.10  O.IOd  0.06  0.61  0.16d 
1949-88  0  1.00  0.02d  0.00  - 2.66e  0.00 
1  0.95e  0.05d  -0.01  -  1.70d  0.03 
2  0.40d  0.05  0.05  0.54  O. Od 
3  0.18  0.06d  0.06  -0.48  0.12d 
1953-92  0  1.00  0.00  0.00  - 3.93e  0.00 
1  1.04e  0.14e  -0.02  -  1.47d  0.13d 
2  0.55e  0.14e  0.06  1.49d  0.2le 
3  0.35d  0.07d  0.07  0.74  0.14d 
Source:  See  table  1. 
a.  The responses  are obtained by simulation of a dynamic system,  estimated  in each case  over the sample period 
indicated  in the first column,  in (DIP,gp,  ir) and an auxiliary equation  for Ag1,. The  numbers are responses  to an 
unexpected  movement  in inflation of  I percentage  point in period 0. 
b.  The expected  value of the annuity value of the growth rate of future dividends,  EAg&. 
c.  Expected  real rate of return on stocks,  ER,,  constructed  as E(DIP)  +  EAg,,. 
d.  t-statistic between  I and 2. 
e.  t-statistic greater than 2. 
and  for each one, computing  the dynamic  effects of an innovation  in in- 
flation  of 1 percent in year 0 on the dividend yield, the rate of capital 
gain, and  the rate  of return  on stocks. 
The same caveats apply to stocks as to bonds. The implicit  assump- 
tion behind  the presence of current  inflation  in the first  two equations  is 
that  any correlation  between inflation  and  unanticipated  capital  gains or 
movements in the dividend yield, and inflation  is interpreted  as re- 
flecting  the effects of inflation  on the other  variables.  Again, some of the 
movements  of inflation  are likely to be anticipated  by the stock market, 
and  thus to be captured  by innovations  in the dividend  yield or the rate 
of capital  gain, rather  than  by innovations  in the inflation  equation. 
The  results  are  presented  in table  7. In year  0, the numbers  in the table 
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effects of unexpected inflation  on the dividend yield and the rate of 
change  of real stock prices within  the year. 7 In years 1 and higher,  the 
numbers  reflect  the effects of anticipated  inflation,  namely  the effects of 
the innovation  at time 0 on the dividend  yield, the rate of capital  gain, 
and the rate of return  on stocks, defined  as the expected dividend  yield 
over the year plus the expected annuity  value of real  dividend  growth.  I 
see three  main  results  in that  table. 
The first  is that  an unexpected  increase  in inflation  in year  0 leads to a 
sharp  decrease in stock prices in that year. This has been widely docu- 
mented  elsewhere. The estimated  effect has increased  steadily  through 
time, from a - 0.48 percent  decrease in real prices for a 1.0 percentage 
point increase  in inflation  in the first  subsample,  to a - 3.93 percent  de- 
crease in real prices in the latest subsample.  Other  things being equal, 
this leads in later years to a higher  expected dividend  yield in year 1 in 
response  to an innovation  in inflation  in year  0. 
The second result  is the  positive  effect of an innovation  in inflation  on 
expected future  dividend  growth. Many  theories  have argued  for either 
a positive or a negative  correlation  of inflation  with dividend  growth;38 
the evidence suggests, if anything,  a small  positive effect throughout  the 
sample.  Putting  this result  and the previous  one together,  an innovation 
in inflation  increases  both the expected dividend  yield and  the expected 
rate of growth  of dividends.  Thus, on both grounds,  it increases  the ex- 
pected rate  of return  on stocks. This is shown in the last column, which 
shows that  an innovation  in inflation  of 1 percentage  point is associated 
with a lasting  increase  in the expected rate of return  on stocks of 0.1 to 
0.2 percent. 
The third result is interesting  because it potentially  reconciles the 
findings  in the table with apparently  contradictory  findings  by others 
that expected inflation  has a negative effect on the rate of return on 
stocks.39  Note first that while the innovation  in inflation  and thus the 
capital  loss in year 0 are both unexpected,  once the innovation  has been 
observed, the numbers  for later years are expected by investors. The 
interesting  number  then is that for the expected capital  loss in year 1. 
Estimates  from  all but  the first  three  subsamples  (that  is, the subsamples 
37. Remember  that  the dividend  yield is defined  as the ratio  of dividends  during  year  t 
to the price  at the beginning  of year  t, so that  only the numerator  responds  within  year  t. 
38. For  a review, see Ely and  Robinson  (1989). 
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starting  in 1929, 1930, and 1931) yield an anticipated  capital loss in 
year 1. 
What  this implies  is that, in the year  following  the innovation  in infla- 
tion, people can expect a higher  dividend  yield but also a further  capital 
loss, which typically more than offsets the higher dividend yield. In 
other words, the expected one-year rate of return  goes down after an 
increase  in inflation.  As we look at expected rates of return  over longer 
holding  periods, the higher  dividend  yield eventually  more  than offsets 
the anticipated  capital  loss. For the rate of return  I have been focusing 
on in this  paper,  which  corresponds  to holding  the stock forever, the ex- 
pected rate of return  depends  only on the dividend  yield and the rate of 
growth  of dividends,  and  thus increases  with inflation. 
The  expected  capital  loss following  an innovation  in inflation  explains 
why the research  that has focused on short holding  period rates of re- 
turn,  typically  from  a month  to a year, has found  negative  effects of ex- 
pected inflation.  This suggests that  studies  that  looked at longer  holding 
periods  would  find  a positive rather  than  a negative  effect; this is indeed 
what a recent study by Jacob Boudoukh and Matthew Richardson, 
which  regresses  five-year  realized  rates of return  on expected inflation, 
has  found.40 
Putting  the results of this section together, innovations  in inflation 
lead to a decrease  in real  bond  rates-  but only for a few years, at most; 
they lead to what appears  to be a persistent  increase in real rates of re- 
turn  on stocks. These results  imply  a relation  between inflation  and the 
premium  that is stronger  in the short run (while inflation  affects real 
bond  rates)  than  in the long run. 
Conclusions 
The two main  conclusions of this paper  are that the equity premium 
has gone steadily  down since the early 1950s,  and that inflation  contrib- 
uted to the transitory  increase above trend  in the 1970s  and the transi- 
tory decrease  below trend  in the 1980s.  Today, the premium  appears  to 
be around  2-3 percent. The results in the paper  imply that, if inflation 
remains  low, it should  not be expected to move much  from  this current 
value. 
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Figure 15.  The Cost of Capital, 1929-93a 
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Source:  See  tables 2 and 3. 
a.  The cost  of capital is a weighted average of the expected  rates of return on stocks  and twenty-year  bonds with 
equal weights  of 0.5 for stocks  and bonds. 
This has a number  of implications,  not only for finance  but also for 
macroeconomics.  I shall briefly  mention  three. The first is that the fi- 
nancial  component  of the cost of capital  has moved much less than its 
two underlying  elements over the last sixty-five years. This point is 
made  graphically  in figure  15, which plots an equally weighted  average 
of the expected rates of return  on stocks and twenty-year  bonds,4'  as 
well as its underlying  components.  The cost of capital so obtained  ap- 
pears nearly  constant  compared  to the variations  in expected stock and 
bond  rates  of return.  Thus, in thinking  of what  happened  in the 1970s  or 
the 1980s,  for example, we should  be wary  of focusing  primarily  on real 
bond  rates. 
41. The weights  are chosen for symmetry  and I do not attempt  tax corrections.  The 
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The second point  is closely related.  Decreases in the equity  premium 
are likely to translate  into both an increase  in expected bond  rates and  a 
decrease in expected rates of return  on stocks. This is indeed what I 
have shown. It is thus reasonable  to anticipate  higher  real  bond rates in 
the future  than  in the past. 
The third  point follows from the second. Firms that have access to 
both equity and bond finance  may not be affected much by changes in 
the equity  premium.  But  for those that  have to rely only on debt  finance, 
the change in equilibrium  real bond rates is much more important.  In 
particular,  higher  real rates on debt imply  that governments  may find  it 
more dangerous  and more difficult  to rely on deficit and debt finance. 
The arithmetic  of debt  accumulation  with  low growth  and  high  real  bond 
rates  has been painfully  obvious in the recent  past in many  OECD  coun- 
tries. If real interest  rates remain  high, those lessons will have to be re- 
membered. 
APPENDIX 
Detailed Source Tables 
THE  FOLLOWING  TABLES  provide detailed calculations and source mate- 
rial for tables, figures, and calculations  in the text. Tables Al  and A2 
show short-term  and medium-term  real  interest  rates, for the world  and 
individual  countries, from 1978-93. Table A3 provides information  on 
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Table Al.  Short-Term Real Interest Rates, 1978-93 
Percent 
United  United 
Year  States  Kingdom  Germany  France  Italy  Japan  Worlda 
1978  0.3  -4.7  -0.9  -  1.2  1.0  -  2.1  -0.8 
1979  0.6  -0.8  1.3  -  5.9  -  2.2  -0.2  -0.4 
1980  0.0  1.0  2.7  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.5 
1981  0.8  3.9  6.0  -  1.5  -0.9  2.7  1.6 
1982  5.8  4.2  6.8  1.5  5.5  2.7  4.8 
1983  2.9  5.4  4.6  0.4  6.4  3.9  3.4 
1984  5.2  3.5  4.9  4.9  3.6  5.1  4.9 
1985  4.2  5.6  3.4  4.1  4.0  4.1  4.1 
1986  3.3  7.0  2.1  4.2  7.8  2.1  3.5 
1987  1.0  7.1  5.2  6.3  3.9  3.3  3.1 
1988  1.4  4.7  1.5  4.9  4.1  2.0  2.3 
1989  3.3  5.0  2.8  5.3  5.6  2.4  3.5 
1990  3.5  8.1  4.1  6.3  7.9  4.7  4.9 
1991  2.0  9.6  5.1  6.3  4.5  4.6  4.1 
1992  -0.2  5.6  5.1  7.3  6.1  3.1  2.7 
1993  0.4  4.2  4.9  9.4  7.1  2.0  2.8 
Source:  For  1978-83,  Blanchard  and  Summers  (1984,  table  2,  p.  278).  For  1984-93,  nominal  rates  are  from 
Initerniationial  Finanicial Statistics,  line 60c for the United States,  the United Kingdom, Germany,  and Italy, and line 
60b for France and Japan. Inflation forecasts  are from DRI,  U.S.  and European Reviews.  Nominal rates are for the 
first month of each  year.  They  are Treasury  bill rates for the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and 
Italy, and money market rates for France and Japan. Real rates are obtained by subtracting DRI December  forecasts 
of inflation for the first quarter of the following  year. 
a.  The  world rate is constructed  using relative GDP weights  at current exchange  rates as relative weights  for the 
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Table A2.  Medium-Term Real Interest Rates,  1978-93 
Percent 
United  United 
Year  States  Kingdom  Germany  France  Italy  Worlda 
1978  2.2  0.1  1.4  2.4  4.5  2.1 
1979  2.1  4.5  2.4  -0.1  1.1  2.0 
1980  1.0  4.1  3.3  3.2  1.9  2.0 
1981  2.2  2.1  4.9  3.9  1.8  2.7 
1982  6.9  5.3  5.7  3.3  7.4  6.3 
1983  4.3  2.3  4.0  6.3  5.1  4.3 
1984  6.5  3.3  3.9  5.1  3.8  5.7 
1985  6.2  5.8  4.6  4.3  3.2  5.6 
1986  4.6  6.7  3.7  4.2  6.5  5.8 
1987  2.4  6.7  4.0  5.6  3.2  3.5 
1988  3.4  4.7  3.5  6.9  3.7  3.9 
1989  4.1  4.9  4.1  5.2  4.1  3.3 
1990  3.4  7.2  5.3  6.8  6.8  4.8 
1991  3.7  6.4  6.1  6.7  5.8  4.9 
1992  2.7  6.0  4.9  4.9  3.2  3.6 
1993  2.5  3.1  4.3  5.2  6.6  3.5 
Sources:  For  1978-83, Blanchard and Summers (1984, table 4, p. 280). For  1984-93, nominal rates for the  United 
States,  the  United  Kingdom,  Germany,  France and Italy,  OECD Financial  Statistics;  line llb2  for Italy,  line Ilbi 
for the others.  Inflation forecasts  from DRI,  U.S.  and European Reviews.  Forecasts  for Japan were  not available. 
Nominal  rates are for the first month of each  year. For the United States  and the United Kingdom, on government 
bonds, in the secondary market, with five years to maturity. For Germany, on public bonds, in the secondary market, 
with three- to seven-year  maturity. For France,  on bonds in the secondary  market with ten years or more maturity. 
For Italy, on 'creditop"  bonds,  with five-year average  maturity. 
Real rates are obtained by subtracting forecasts  of inflation over the life of the bond, as described in the text. The 
forecasts  used are DRI forecasts  of inflation, as of the previous  December.  The  maturities are assumed  to be five 
years for the United  States,  the  United Kingdom, West Germany and Italy, ten years for France. 
a.  The world rate is constructed  using relative GDP weights  at current exchange  rates as relative weights for the 
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Table A3.  Dividend-Price Ratios, 1978-92 
Percent 
United  United 
Year  States  Kingdom  Germany  France  Italy  Japan  Worlda 
1978  5.3  5.5  3.2  6.7  5.0  1.6  4.4 
1979  5.4  5.6  3.7  5.7  3.4  1.6  4.5 
1980  5.4  6.7  5.7  6.3  2.5  1.6  4.7 
1981  5.1  6.1  5.7  8.1  2.0  1.5  4.7 
1982  5.8  5.6  5.5  7.9  2.3  1.7  5.0 
1983  4.4  4.7  4.0  6.6  2.4  1.4  3.9 
1984  4.6  4.5  3.6  5.2  3.1  1.1  3.9 
1985  4.3  4.4  3.3  4.0  2.9  1.0  3.5 
1986  3.6  4.1  2.7  2.6  1.6  0.8  3.7 
1987  3.1  3.3  3.3  2.9  1.9  0.6  2.4 
1988  3.6  4.1  4.0  4.0  2.6  0.5  2.9 
1989  3.4  4.2  3.4  2.6  2.4  0.5  2.7 
1990  3.6  4.8  3.1  2.9  2.8  0.5  2.8 
1991  3.3  4.9  3.6  3.5  3.7  0.6  2.9 
1992  3.1  4.8  3.7  3.4  3.9  0.9  2.8 
Sources:  OECD Financial  Statistics,  various issues.  Dividend-price  ratios are yearly averages of quarterly values; 
quarterly values  are for the first month of each  quarter. 
a.  The world rate is constructed  using relative GDP weights  at current exchange  rates as relative weights for the 
six countries  indicated above. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert Shiller: What  are we to make of the striking  fact that the divi- 
dend-price  ratio, observed  in the world  stock market,  has declined sub- 
stantially  since the late 1970s-as  shown in Olivier  Blanchard's  paper, 
in figure  3 or table  A3? In the world  bond  market,  a similar  movement  in 
real  interest  rates has not occurred,  as figures  2 and 8 and  table  A2 indi- 
cate. Real long-term  interest rates displayed a hump-shaped  pattern 
over this period, and are still higher  at the end of Blanchard's  sample 
than  they were in the late 1970s.  ' The dividend-price  ratio  is often con- 
sidered  another  sort  of long-term  real  interest  rate, so it might  have been 
expected to move with the real  long-term  interest  rate  observed  in bond 
markets,  and to have shown the same hump-shaped  pattern  since the 
late 1970s. 
But there  is an important  difference  between the dividend-price  ratio 
observed  in stock markets  and the real  long-term  interest  rate  observed 
in bond markets;  the dividend-price  ratio can be affected by expected 
growth rates of future dividends. Blanchard  uses an economic model 
(his equations 1 through  4) to define long-term  real interest rates from 
bond  market  data  and to take account  of this dividend-growth  effect on 
stock market  data;  the model  allows estimates  to be made  of the ex ante 
equity premium-the  expected difference between real stock returns 
and real bond returns.  This present  value model allows this equity pre- 
mium  to be estimated  without  ever using  the noisy data  on actual  returns 
in the stock market. 
1. The  opening  line to Blanchard's  paper  suggests  that  real  bond  yields  are  now much 
higher  than  they  were  in the early 1980s;  looking  at the plots, I would  rather  emphasize  the 
hump-shaped  pattern  of real  rates since then;  long real  rates have come down a lot since 
the late 1980s. 
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The assumption that this expected equity premium is  constant 
through  time  has been discussed  many  times  by other  researchers.  Mak- 
ing the left-hand  sides of equations 1 and 3 equal up to a constant  addi- 
tive equity  premium  indicates  that  stock price  movements  (or dividend- 
price ratio  movements)  can be understood  entirely  in terms of changes 
in the rate  of discount,  as measured  by interest  rates, and  changes  in ex- 
pected  dividend  growth  rates. This  model  then  interprets  changes  in div- 
idend-price  ratios  as due to a rational  response  to new information  about 
interest rates and information  about future  growth rates of dividends. 
This model has been tested and rejected  by other researchers.  Blanch- 
ard here goes a step beyond these studies and characterizes  the time 
variation in the equity premium, and does this for the world stock 
market. 
An important  conclusion  in this paper  is that  the decline  in the spread 
between the dividend-price  ratio  in the world  stock market  and the real 
interest  rate  in the world  bond  market  since 1980  appears  unreconcilable 
with this present  value model. To reconcile  that spread  with  this model, 
one would need to assume that the expected future  annual  growth  rate 
of real dividends was about 4.7 percent higher in 1990 than in 1980; 
Blanchard  states that  there  is no reason  for people to expect such higher 
dividend  growth  now. I would  certainly  agree  with that  view; this is just 
another  manifestation  of the extraneous  volatility  of the dividend-price 
ratio  that  John  Campbell,  Andrea  Beltratti,  and  I documented.2  The div- 
idend-price  ratio  has historically  moved  around  largely  independently  of 
the fundamentals  defined by the present value model. Low dividend- 
price  ratios  relative  to interest  rates  are, in this model, supposed  to fore- 
cast increases  in dividends;  in  practice  these forecasts  implicit  in the div- 
idend-price ratio have been very wild. Indeed, dividend-price  ratio 
movements appear to be due to something endogenous to the stock 
market. 
Blanchard's  conclusions  about  the movements  in the equity  premium 
are not obvious to someone eyeballing  the usual  data;  his analysis  of his 
model, in equations  1  through  4, is essential  to understanding  his conclu- 
sion. Someone looking at the usual data would probably  note first that 
nominal  interest rates have come down a lot since the early 1980s  and 
might  think  that this is a good reason  for stock prices to go up and divi- 
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dend-price  ratios to decline. Doesn't the booming stock market  make 
sense from  the lower nominal  interest  rates?  This interpretation  appears 
daily  in newspapers  and  other  popular  media.  Blanchard  is more  careful 
than  the media;  recognizing  that the dividend-price  ratio is more like a 
real  long-term  rate  than  a nominal  long-term  rate, he compares  it instead 
with  his constructed  real  long  rates. He constructs  these, quite  appropri- 
ately, by running  the regressions  of his constructed  actual  inflation  vari- 
ables  Ar5 and  Ar2O  (created  using  his model,  from  equation  2) onto fore- 
casting  variables  in his tables 1 and 2.3 
While  the later 1980s  were a period  when world  nominal  interest  rates 
were falling sharply  from their peak in the early 1980s, real long-term 
rates were unusually  high  throughout  this period. Hence, the decline in 
nominal  rates in the later 1980s  can be attributed  entirely  to declines in 
inflationary  expectations, and hence this decline is not a reason, in the 
context of the rational  model presented  here, for the decline since the 
early 1980s  in the dividend-price  ratio. 
This conclusion does not rule out that the decline in the dividend- 
price  ratio  might  have something  to do with  the decline  in nominal  inter- 
est rates  if people are  irrationally  overreacting  to the declines  in nominal 
rates. That  the stock market  may be substantially  influenced  by such ir- 
rational  overreactions  was hypothesized  first  by Franco  Modligiani  and 
Richard  Cohn  in 1979.4  The current  decline  of both  dividend-price  ratios 
and  nominal  long  rates  would  appear  to provide  some new out-of-sample 
confirmation  of their  theory, and an interpretation  of one of the causes 
of the excess volatility  of dividend-price  ratios. 
One reason  why Modigliani  and  Cohn's paper  has not received more 
attention,  I think,  is that,  by advancing  an  explicitly  behavioral  hypothe- 
sis about the stock market,  it cannot be easily tested. Once one recog- 
nizes that  there  is such a behavioral  component  to stock prices, then  one 
would  naturally  also recognize  that  there  are other  judgment  errors  that 
people make  in their  pricing  of the stock market.  Thus the model is not 
tight;  the observed correlation  of nominal  rates with dividend-price  ra- 
3. Note that  the long-term  interest  rate  sometimes  gets a negative  sign  in Blanchard's 
regressions  of long-term  inflation  on information  variables,  as seen in the lower panel  of 
table 2. Such wrong signs have a long history. The term "Gibson  paradox"  coined by 
Keynes  refers  to a tendency  for positive  correlation  between  long-term  interest  rates  and 
price  levels. Since  price  levels have  historically  shown  some  tendency  for  mean  reversion, 
price  levels were negatively  correlated  with  subsequent  inflation. 
4. Modligiani  and Cohn  (1979). 122  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
tios cannot  give any impressive  confirmation  of Modigliani  and Cohn's 
hypothesis. 
Modigliani  and  Cohn's  paper  can be improved  by making  corrections 
in the dividend-price  ratio for forecastable  changes in future dividend 
growth  rates. This is essentially what Blanchard  does in this paper, in 
the lower panel of table 4. The dependent  variable  is the ex post equity 
premium  as he defines it; it is found  to be strongly  negatively  related  to 
the nominal  long rate. His evidence is analogous  to the evidence that 
Beltratti  and I found for the United States and the United Kingdom; 
there  does appear  to be an overreaction  of dividend-price  ratios  to nomi- 
nal  long rates.5 
Of course, I am not quite  justified  in using the word "overreaction," 
since correlation  does not prove causality. To me, the most impressive 
evidence in Modigliani  and Cohn's paper  that the market  really  overre- 
acts to nominal  interest  rates was their  evidence from  memoranda  from 
large  brokerage  firms  advising  institutional  investors about  the level of 
the market  and  interest  rates;  they found  that  the fallacious  use of nomi- 
nal interest  rates  was widespread.  If such errors  are widespread  among 
these memoranda,  then surely the errors  are being  made  by many  other 
market  participants.  This evidence also suggests that there might  be a 
correction  in the stock market  should  nominal  interest  rates  increase. 
Let me comment  briefly  on the use of the the data on British  index- 
linked gilts. The idea that the market  for indexed debt in the United 
Kingdom  measures  the same long-term  real interest  rate under  discus- 
sion here neglects to observe that the index-linked  gilts are very differ- 
ent instruments  from the nominal  bonds used elsewhere in this paper; 
they guarantee  a real  coupon. There  is likely to be a substantially  differ- 
ent market  for such an instrument,  and the yields in this market  are af- 
fected by supply  and  demand  for these particular  bonds. The amount  is- 
sued of U.K.-indexed bonds is a decision of the British  government.  If 
they issued very few, then the yields would  be very low, since the most 
eager buyers would bid their prices up. We know in principle  that the 
real rate on the bonds they issue depends on the number  of bonds that 
they issue, even though  it is hard  to get any empirical  evidence to con- 
firm  this, just as it is hard  to get empirical  evidence to confirm  that the 
yield spread  between shorts and longs is affected by decisions of how 
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much  to issue at the various  horizons. Still, the decisions in the United 
Kingdom  about how much to issue have more impact  on their market 
because they have the only major  indexed  debt  long-term  market. 
Let me conclude  by trying  to offer some interpretation  of the current 
low dividend-price  ratio that seems so inexplicable after reading the 
Blanchard  paper.  Offering  such an interpretation  is inherently  risky. 
It would seem that  an important  factor  now in the low dividend-price 
ratio around  the world relative to ten years ago would certainly  be the 
relatively  low nominal  interest rates, given the judgment  errors  docu- 
mented  by Modigliani  and  Cohn. But, possibly, other  factors, even less 
easily quantified,  are also at work. I have stressed in my own work that 
because people talk to one another  about investments, there is a ten- 
dency for attitudes and ideas to drift through  time. Furthermore,  be- 
cause people talk to people around  the world, these new attitudes  and 
ideas spread  around  the world. 
The reason that  different  countries  experience similar  movements  in 
their dividend-price  ratios must surely have something  to do with the 
fact that investors in these countries  are looking at,one another,  using 
one another  as examples. The same thing  happens  at the time of a stock 
market  crash. Surely, the tendency  for stock markets  around  the world 
to crash  at the same  time  has something  to do with  people looking  at one 
another's  emotional  or intuitive  reactions  to events; by the same token, 
the tendency for dividend-price  ratios to show similar  movements  has 
somewhat  of the same social origin. 
If we were all independent,  each of us taking  a fresh look at all the 
basic  facts regarding  the stock market  and  forming  an independent  opin- 
ion about  how much  stock to hold, then the law of large  numbers  would 
seem to imply  that  people would not change  their  opinions  except in re- 
sponse  to some basic and  important  change  in the facts. In  practice,  peo- 
ple are not independent;  there is a collective attention and collective 
memory  around  the world. 
The sociologist Maurice  Halbwachs  coined the term "the collective 
memory"  to refer  to memories  that  society has in common  and  that  con- 
tinue to persist by constant reinforcement  through  social communica- 
tion.6  His argument  is that  each of us hears  vastly more  information  than 
our brains  could possibly store, we forget almost everything  we hear, 
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and only memories that are consistently reinforced remain. An im- 
portant  reinforcing  mechanism  is social interaction.  For an example of 
the importance  of such reinforcing,  think  back on some movie that you 
saw only once years  ago. How much  do you really  remember?  Don't you 
tend to remember  the scenes that people discussed later? Do you re- 
member  the line "Play  it again,  Sam"?  For most of us this one line is the 
only concrete  dialogue  from  the movie "Casablanca"  that  we remember. 
Why  do so many  of us remember  that  same  line?  It must  be because it is 
replayed  for us again and again. Actually, this line is not even in the 
movie; it entered the collective memory  as the result of some strange 
mistake. All of the actual  dialogue  of the film  has disappeared  from  the 
collective memory, to be replaced  by this artifact.  This example illus- 
trates  how quixotic  and selective the collective memory  is. 
The memory  of the crash of 1929  and the Great  Depression-which 
Blanchard  notes is gradually  fading-is  part  of the collective memory. 
It has reached  the importance  of a folk legend. The legend  concentrates 
on the Black  Monday,  October  28, 1929,  when the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average  fell 12.8 percent  in a single day. (It fell an additional  11.7 per- 
cent the next day.) But this memory  is capricious.  How many  people re- 
member  that the market  rallied  on Wednesday  and Thursday,  to close 
on Thursday,  October  31, 1929,  only 8.5 percent  below its close the pre- 
ceding Friday?  Black Monday  was a temporary  blip  in the index. If one 
looks at a plot of the data, the real event that stands out is the gradual 
decline  from 1929  to 1932:  an 89.2 percent  decline  from  the close on Sep- 
tember  3, 1929,  to the close on July 8, 1932.  But that gradual  decline is 
not what people remember.  And how many people remember  the 93.9 
percent increase in the Dow from July 8, 1932, to September  7, 1932? 
The truth  is, there  are vast numbers  of interesting  stories  in the data:  the 
complexity  of the story  told by these numbers-as in any economic  time 
series-is  mind-boggling.  Similarly,  the impressions  and recollections 
that  are  in the collective memory  are  inevitably  capricious  and  selective. 
How much stock should  one hold if the dividend-price  ratio  is 2 per- 
cent?  If it is 3 percent?  If it is 5 percent?  Unfortunately,  there  is no clear 
answer.  There  are millions  of facts about  the stock market,  and no clear 
theoretical  framework  to hang  them on that would allow one to answer 
these questions. One must somehow make a decision about how much 
7. The mistake  may  be due to Woody  Allen, who made  a movie  in 1972  entitled  "Play 
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stocks to hold  in one's portfolio-and such decisions collectively deter- 
mine  the level of stock prices. When  there is no clear, objective theory 
about  how to make this choice, it is inevitable  that people, being what 
they are, will be buffeted  by social forces and influenced  by overly sim- 
ple comparisons.  When the decision about how much stock to hold is 
so tenuous, people will try to make up their minds  with some intuitive 
judgment,  which means  that they will fall back on those facts and theo- 
ries that  they know and  remember  well. 
What  are  the changing  popular  models  that  are  in vogue that  have had 
an impact  on the level of stock prices?  Let me go out on a limb  and  give 
a theory based on casual impressions.  A trend in social thought  that I 
think  can be discerned  is an increasing  awareness  of the fact that stocks 
have generally  outperformed  fixed income and other investments. The 
public  cannot absorb  complicated  theories, and a theory that one class 
of investments  is just the best class is one that is so simple that it may 
easily obtain  some currency.  Real estate used to be an investment  that 
was so regarded  by many  people; the idea that  land  prices  could only go 
up was widely  remarked  upon  in Japan;  the theory  had  even had  a name 
there,  the "land  myth."  But recent  declines  in real  estate prices  have tar- 
nished this popular  theory. If the theory that stocks have always done 
well is increasingly  finding  its way into the collective memory, then it 
ought  to raise stock prices relative  to dividends.  I do not have any proof 
that  awareness  of this is increasing,  but I did try to confirm  that aware- 
ness of this fact is substantial  today. As part  of the semiannual  surveys 
of investment  managers  that Fumiko Kon-Ya, Yoshiro Tsutsui, and I 
have been conducting,  I asked U.S. respondents  to tell me if they have 
heard  something  like the claim  that  there  has been no thirty-year  period 
in U.S. history  since 1860  when U.S. government  securities  had  outper- 
formed  stocks.8  (Note that this observation  appears  in a slightly  differ- 
ent  form  in Blanchard's  paper.)  Of  the 125  responses  I received  from  Au- 
gust through  October 1993, 52 percent of respondents said that had 
heard  such a story often, and an additional  22 percent  said  that  they had 
heard  it once or twice. (Twenty-six  percent said they had never heard 
it.) Only if we continue to conduct surveys can we learn whether this 
story is growing  in the collective memory, and only if we ask in other 
countries  can we confirm  its international  currency. 
8. For  a description  of these surveys  see Shiller,  Kon-Ya,  and  TsuTsui  (1992). 126  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity, 2:1993 
We do have some short  time series on social thought  that  suggest  rea- 
sons behind  the decline  in the dividend-price  ratio. One  of our  questions 
asked respondents  whether  they agreed  with the statement,  "Although 
I expect a substantial  drop  in stock prices  in the U. S. ultimately,  I advise 
being relatively  heavily invested in stocks for the time being because I 
think that prices are likely to rise for awhile." This question was in- 
tended to get at a sort of speculative motive for holding stocks. The 
wording  of this question  has been criticized;  it is hard  to know  what  a no 
answer  means. But we are stuck  with  this question  as it reads  if we want 
to have a time series. Of the 127 U.S. respondents  who answered  this 
question in our August-October 1993 survey, 31 percent chose yes, 
compared  with 12  percent  a year  ago. But the recent sample  is not much 
different  from  the 34 percent  who chose yes in mid-1989.  The difference 
from 1989  is that, in response to a question that asked respondents  to 
choose whether the stock market  was "too low," "too high," "about 
right,"  or "do  not know,"  the percent  picking  too high  is now 43 percent, 
(and  the percent  choosing too low is 2 percent),  compared  with only 19 
percent  that  picked too high  (and 16  percent  that chose too low) in mid- 
1989.  This evidence is consistent with a view that the rise in the market 
since 1989  is substantially  speculative.  Further  confirmation  of this view 
is found in the fact that now, when asked to give the probability  of a 
crash  in the next six months,  respondents  estimate  an average  probabil- 
ity of 21 percent, compared  with 15  percent  in mid-  1989.  The origins  of 
opinions  about  the short-run  course of the market  are especially hard  to 
understand;  as regards  attempts  to time the market,  people are playing 
a game against  one another,  watching  one another  closely and trying  to 
make their move first. No one could expect to easily understand  and 
model  the outcome of such a game. 
Summing  up these ideas to explain  the low dividend-price  ratio, I can 
think  of three  possible  theories:  the overreaction  to low nominal  interest 
rates;  the growing  popular  notion  that  stocks have always  outperformed 
other investments; and a speculative feeling that the market will go 
higher  for a while. 
Jeremy J.  Siegel: The equity premium,  formally defined as the ex- 
pected arithmetic  return  on equity  in excess of the "risk-free"  asset, is a 
topic that  is of importance  to both  investors  and  economists. The size of 
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pears  far in excess of what is justified  by standard  asset-pricing  models 
with reasonable  levels of risk aversion, given the behavior  of the vari- 
ance-covariance  matrix  of historical  returns  on bonds, stocks, and con- 
sumption.  The unexplainably  large  size of the premium  has been termed 
the "equity  premium  paradox." 
Many modifications  to the standard  finance model have been pro- 
posed that may help explain the high level of the equity premium,  and 
these are amply  cited in Olivier  Blanchard's  paper.  But the author  tack- 
les the premium  from  another  standpoint,  arguing  that the large  excess 
return  is due primarily  to an unusual  period  from  the Great  Depression 
through  the early 1970s,  which  may  not be typical  of longer  periods, his- 
torically  or prospectively.  Furthermore,  Blanchard  maintains  that  there 
is evidence that looking  ahead, th- equity premium  will stand  closer to 
the far lower levels that existed in the nineteenth  and early twentieth 
century. 
These are views to which I am quite sympathetic  and about which I 
have written  extensively.  ' Discussion  figures  DI and  D2 plot thirty-year 
moving  averages since 1802  of historical  annualized  arithmetic  real re- 
turns  on stocks and  bonds, and  the difference  between the two. Discus- 
sion  table  DI summarizes  real  stock and  bond  returns  and  the equity  pre- 
mium  for various  subperiods. 
Several  important  inferences  can be drawn  from  these data.  The first 
is that the trend of the average real return  on stocks has remained  re- 
markably  constant  through  the last two centuries,  while the real  returns 
on fixed-income  assets collapsed during  most of the twentieth  century. 
During  the period  when bond  returns  were very low, stock returns  were 
indeed  high, but not that much  higher  than  they had  been in the past. 
Some authors  have noted  that  the paradox  is more  of a real rate  para- 
dox than  an equity  premium  paradox.  In other  words, it is the unusually 
low real  rates  on fixed-income  assets that  is more  difficult  to explain  than 
the high  return  on equity. In fact some of the increase  in equity returns 
during  the immediate  postwar  period  might  well be explained  by the low 
returns  on fixed-income  assets, which allowed firms to leverage their 
capital  stock cheaply. I fully agree  with Blanchard  that the total cost of 
capital  did not change markedly  during  the period; what changed  was 
the relative  magnitude  of bond and stock returns. 
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Although  the high returns  on equity in the postwar  period might  be 
explained  as result of the undervaluation  of stocks following  the great 
1929-32  stock crash,  as Blanchard  suggests,  it is more  difficult  to explain 
the collapse of the real return  on fixed-income  assets, particularly  of 
short-term  bonds. I believe that  one of the reasons  is that  market  partici- 
pants (as well as most economists) did not fully recognize the signifi- 
cance of the changes  that  were taking  place in the monetary  system dur- 
ing and after  the Great  Depression. The progressive  demonetization  of 
gold and  the movement  toward  a paper  money standard  set the stage  for 
the postwar inflation.  Yet during  the war, most investors and econo- 
mists predicted  that  another  depression  would occur when government 
military  demands  ceased. These investors bought  bonds in anticipation 
of the deflation  that  had  followed every previous  war. 
The fact that the postwar  inflation  drastically  reduced  real long-term 
bond  returns  is well known. However, it is a puzzle  why holders  of Trea- 
sury  bills did not appear  to catch up to the inflationary  bias of monetary 
policy, given the general inertia  of the inflationary  process. Investors 
may still have entertained  regressive expectations of inflation,  misun- 
derstanding  the nature  of the new monetary  system. Perhaps  the pegging 
operations  of the Federal  Reserve and deposit rate controls  were a fac- 
tor, although these explanations may not be consistent with flexible 
price macroeconomic  models. 
Clearly  by the 1970s,  and  especially  the 1980s  and 1990s,  bondholders 
had caught  on to the inflationary  bias that  exists under  a fiat  money sys- 
tem. If unanticipated  inflation  is the primary  reason for the equity pre- 
mium  puzzle, then the premium  may return  to a level similar  to that in 
the previous  century,  if inflation  remains  low, as it has during  the 1990s. 
A lower equity premium  would result  from either an increase in future 
real  bond  returns  or a reduction  in future  equity  returns,  or both. 
As of early September 1993, the thirty-year  zero coupon bond was 
selling  at a yield of about  6.2 percent. Assuming  a 4 percent  average  an- 
nual  compound  rate  of inflation  over the next thirty  years, the real  return 
on these bonds would be 2.1 percent (allowing  for the cross-product 
term of the Fisher equation).  A 3 percent average  inflation  yields a 3.1 
percent real return  on a thirty-year  fixed income security. The latter  is 
closer to the real  returns  on indexed  securities  in the United Kingdom. 
There  are two ways to compute  the future  real return  on equity. The 
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well as possible for cyclical factors. I have collected a survey of ex- 
pected earnings  estimates  from  a group  of analysts  on the S&P  500  index 
for 1994.  The average  is about  $28  per S&P  share.  Given  that  the current 
index is 460, this results in a 6.1 percent real return.  It should  be noted 
from  discussion  table DI that the average  real compound  annual  return 
on equity has been remarkably  stable over the past two centuries, fluc- 
tuating  between 6.6 percent  and 7.0 percent  over the major  subperiods, 
so the prospective  yield now is a little  lower than  average. 
A second way to estimate  the real  expected return  on equity  is to take 
the current  dividend yield and add the expected growth rate of divi- 
dends. The 1994 projected dividend payout on the S&P 500 index is 
$13.32,  which, at current  levels of the index, is a 2.9 percent  return.  This 
is extraordinarily  low on a historical  basis. However, this dividend  rep- 
resents less than one-half  of the estimated  earnings  on the S&P 500 in- 
dex. If this payout ratio (48 percent)  is maintained,  and the firms  in the 
S&P  500  index  earned  6.1 percent  on retained  earnings,  this would  result 
in a dividend  growth  rate  of about  3.2 percent  per year, so that  the total 
return  would  be 6.1 percent.  Of  course, this is a simple  application  of the 
principle  that the return  on shares (excluding  taxes) is independent  of 
the dividend  payout  ratio. 
It should  be noted  that  a dividend  growth  rate  of 3.2 percent  would  be 
high  by historical  standards.  Since World  War  II, real dividends  on the 
S&P  500 index have increased  by only 2.0 percent  per year. But during 
most of the time the dividend  payout ratio was higher,  which may ex- 
plain  why the past dividend  growth  rate  was lower.2 
Blanchard  believes that 2 percent is a better estimate  of future  divi- 
dend growth. Based on historical  patterns,  this may be true. But there 
are several factors that may argue  for higher  growth. First is the rela- 
tively low dividend  payout  ratio,  and  second is the high  "quality"  of cur- 
rent earnings.  By quality  I mean that firms  now are experiencing  very 
high  cash flows relative  to reported  earnings.  The nearly  record  low in- 
flation  of capital  goods (information  system costs are declining  at a re- 
cord pace) has reduced economic depreciation,  so that reported  earn- 
2.  Many  researchers,  such  as Eugene  Fama  and  Kenneth  French,  have noted  that  the 
real return  on stocks is negatively  dependent  on the dividend  payout  ratio. But this is 
mostly  for intermediate-term  horizons,  such as five years. My own preliminary  research 
indicates  that  over thirty-year  horizons,  the real  returns  on stocks appear  little  affected  by 
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ings are lower than  true  economic earnings.  Furthermore,  international 
growth  prospects  are bright  and  firms  are cutting  costs aggressively.  So 
long-term  dividend growth may well exceed the 2 percent postwar 
figure. 
Taking  a middle  ground  between  the 3.2 percent  growth  derived  from 
dividend  and  earnings  and  the 2.0 percent  historical  rate  yields a 2.6 per- 
cent real growth of dividends. Combined  with a 2.9 percent dividend 
yield, this gives a 5.5 percent  return.  Assuming  that  the long-term  infla- 
tion rate  remains  between 3 percent  and  4 percent  per year, then  the cur- 
rent real yield on long-term  fixed income assets is between 2.1 percent 
and 3.1 percent. This leaves the equity premium  between 2.4 percent 
and 3.4 percent and much more in the ballpark  of the equity premium 
derived  from 1802  through  1926.  So again, I agree  fully with the author 
that  future  equity  premium  is apt to be much  smaller  than  what was ex- 
perienced  over the past sixty-seven years. Whether  this lowers the pre- 
mium  sufficiently  to explain  the equity  premium  paradox  or real  rate  par- 
adox is still unanswered. 
One must  be careful  determining  the difference  between  the arithme- 
tic equity  premium  and  the geometric  premium.  Finance  theory  derives 
the equity premium  in arithmetic  terms, since risk is traded  off against 
per period expected returns.  So when using long horizons, one should 
convert  from  average  annual  compound,  or geometric  returns,  to arith- 
metic returns.  This requires  an estimate  of the variance  of returns,  since 
the arithmetic  return  exceeds the geometric  return  by one-half  the vari- 
ance. Since stocks are far more volatile than  bonds on an annual  basis, 
the premium  measured  in arithmetic  terms  is between 100  and  200 basis 
points higher  than  that  measured  in geometric  terms. 
It should  be further  noted that  when expected  real  returns  are declin- 
ing, the prices of existing  financial  assets will be rising.  For example, if 
investors  progressively  lower their  expectations  of future  interest  rates, 
the price of long-term  bonds will rise. Measured ex post returns on 
bonds  will be high, although  ex ante returns  are  falling.  Many  claim  that 
this is happening  now, sparking  the current  rallies  in the stock and  bond 
market.  This signals  lower returns  for the rest of the decade. 
The difference  between the ex post and ex ante returns  means that 
measurements  of these two returns  are  apt  to be out of phase. In the long 
run, however, the average  of the ex post and ex ante should  converge. 
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turns  trends  into the future  since there are good economic reasons why 
future  returns  might  be negatively  correlated  with current  returns. 
Blanchard  also notes that the equilibrium  premium  depends  not only 
on the variability  of returns  (and  consumption)  but also on the covaria- 
bility of returns.  Blanchard  finds no trend  in the covariability  between 
stock and  bond  returns.  This may well be true  over short  horizons, but  I 
would be surprised  if it held over longer  horizons, especially prospec- 
tively. If economic growth slows, especially in response to a supply 
shock, and  the government  tries  to stimulate  the economy by expanding 
the money supply, then both stocks and bonds would suffer. Further- 
more,  a slowing  economy  would  increase  the budget  deficit,  which  could 
eventually  lead  to monetization  of government  debt  and  higher  inflation. 
These considerations  would make the future covariance between 
stock and  bond  returns  more  positive than  it has been historically,  when 
the world  was on a gold standard  and control  of the money supply  was 
largely  independent  of the central  bank. In equilibrium  this would lead 
to a lower equity premium,  as bonds lose their ability  to hedge against 
recessions accompanied  by falling  prices. It should  be noted that  the re- 
turns  on British  indexed and nonindexed  debt cannot be used to derive 
the expected rate of inflation,  but the expected inflation  rate corrected 
for  these correlation  factors.  If poor  economic  activity  is correlated  with 
higher inflation,  the difference between the yield on nominal  and in- 
dexed debt would  overstate  the expected rate  of inflation. 
If there is one part  of the Blanchard  paper  that I might  quibble  with, 
it is the last paragraph.  Whether  the government  budget deficit raises 
real rates is still hotly debated  among  economists and is not examined 
in the paper. Blanchard  states that high real rates hurt  those industries 
dependent  on debt finance. Certainly  that is true if the high real rates 
were caused  by government  monetary  or fiscal  policy. But I believe that 
the high  real  rates  of the 1980s  were a result  of the enormous  demand  for 
funds in the highly leveraged sectors of the private economy, particu- 
larly  real  estate. Yet the high  real  rates  of the 1980s  did not seem to hurt 
that  sector at all. In fact, prices of real  estate boomed, and  housing  con- 
struction,  especially in the commercial  area, reached  an all-time  high. 
One explanation  for this phenomenon  was the 1981  Tax Act, which 
offered  accelerated  depreciation  schedules,  among  other  benefits,  to the 
real estate sector. This, combined with other factors, drove private 
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in the United  States  over the past several  years  has  corresponded  almost 
precisely  with  the real  estate bust. The bottom  line is that  high  real  rates 
may  be caused by a boom in the debt-financed  sector and  not motivated 
by policy at all. 
In summary,  it is still likely that  the returns  on equity  are higher  than 
can be  justified  by standard  finance  models, even looking  prospectively. 
But I also agree  with Blanchard  that  there  were special  factors  over the 
last half century  that bloated the premium.  Over the next several dec- 
ades, stocks are still  likely to outperform  bonds, but  by a margin  consid- 
erably  smaller  than since either 1926  or World  War  II. 
General Discussion 
Several panel members  contrasted  Olivier  Blanchard's  results with 
the conventional  view of expected stock returns.  Greg Mankiw  noted 
that  the paper's  estimates  of expected returns  are more  pessimistic  than 
suggested by the historical stock returns  analyzed by Jeremy Siegel. 
Blanchard's  results  indicated  that, looking  ahead,  the expected return  is 
about  4 percent.  In contrast,  Siegel's results  show that  the real  return  on 
stocks, averaged  over any thirty-year  period since 1816,  never falls be- 
low 5 percent. If correct, Blanchard's  prediction  of a "new  world,"  un- 
like anything  in the past, has  profound  implications  for long-term  invest- 
ors. Mankiw  also noted that Blanchard's  figures  contrast starkly  with 
projections  of Wall  Street  forecasters,  who continue  to anticipate  robust 
increases in earnings. 
William  Nordhaus  commended  Blanchard's  focus on ex ante returns 
and  noted how different  his forecasts can be from  forecasts based on re- 
cent ex post returns. For example, an unexpected fall in the discount 
rate will result  in unexpected  and high  ex post returns;  extrapolation  of 
these returns suggests future expected returns  are high, when in fact 
they are low. In spite of the merit  of Blanchard's  approach,  Nordhaus 
believed  that  portfolio  managers  are  likely to persist  in using  the ex post 
approach.  He observed  that  the magnitude  of the risk  premium  on a wide 
variety of assets, including  physical capital, farmland,  real estate, in- 
vestment  in energy  conservation,  and  consumer  durables,  are compara- 
ble to the equity premium  examined by Blanchard.  The puzzle is not 
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assets have expected returns  so much  larger  than  the return  expected on 
bills or bonds. This suggests that the explanation  of the puzzle is not 
likely to be found  in special  features  of the stock market. 
The panel  also focused on the implications  of Blanchard's  results  for 
macroeconomics  and for business finance. Ben Bernanke wondered 
how to square  Blanchard's  results  with firms'  financing  decisions in the 
1980s.  Blanchard's  results suggest that equity became cheaper  relative 
to debt in the 1980s. Yet firms  relied more on debt and less on new is- 
sues. This raises  the question  of whether,  as suggested  in the paper,  cau- 
sation  typically  runs  from  the cost of alternative  sources  of funds  to pat- 
terns of finance. Bernanke  noted that the conventional  wisdom during 
the 1980s  was the reverse;  in that  period,  firms  used debt  to retire  equity, 
presumably  boosting the price of their stocks and raising  bond rates. 
Blanchard  replied that this explanation could not explain long-term 
movements  in the premium. 
Ned Phelps questioned the suggestion that the cost of capital-in- 
cluding  both  debt  and  equity-rose  much  less in the 1980s  than  indicated 
by the increase  in real  interest  rates. Phelps  noted  that  new equity  issues 
are quantitatively  small, perhaps  reflecting  the moral  hazard  problems 
in financing  new investment  with  new equity. The large  weight  on equity 
in the estimates  of the cost of capital  reflects  not new issues but  retained 
earnings.  Phelps  suggested  that  counting  internal  finance  as 100  percent 
equity finance  may be inappropriate.  Some of the internal  finance  may 
simply  be used to retire  debt earning  the bond rate;  paying  out the earn- 
ings would be  similarly valued if shareholders receiving dividends 
turned  around  and invested them in bonds. Thus, the bond rate may be 
closer to the opportunity  cost of retained earnings  for shareholders. 
George Perry disagreed  with Blanchard's  characterization  of pension 
funds as long-term  investors. Pension  funds hope to be in business for 
the long  term;  but  they need to explain  themselves to clients every three 
months,  leading  many  to have high  turnover  and short  horizons. 
The construction  of the expected stock return  series generated  sub- 
stantial  discussion. Chris  Sims raised  the possibility  that the rolling  re- 
gressions  used to forecast  inflation  and  dividend  growth  would  generate 
forecasts  that  are too volatile, and  that  a rational  investor  would  not use 
these forecasts in an undiscounted  fashion. In any case, he suggested 
that  Blanchard's  results are likely to be sensitive to the technique  used 
for forecasting  inflation  and dividend  growth. Sims wondered  whether, 136  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  2:1993 
given  the likely  magnitude  of standard  errors,  expected inflation  and  div- 
idends  have statistically  significant  effects on the equity  premium.  Sims 
also noted that the ex ante returns  matched  the ex post returns  at the 
beginning  of the period  but not at the end, and offered  a possible expla- 
nation. For the first  forty years, the expected return  series is calculated 
using  regressions  fitted  to the whole forty-year  sample,  while the rest of 
the forecasts are taken  from rolling  regressions.  Blanchard  replied  that 
his results  were robust  to alternative  ways of treating  the earlier  period. 
Nordhaus  noted that expected future  dividends,  treated  as the determi- 
nant of stock prices, depend on future  earnings  and payout ratios. To 
avoid the need to forecast future earnings, he proposed the dividend 
payout ratio  as a predictor  of dividend  growth. But Blanchard  reported 
that  the dividend-payout  ratio  did not work  well as a predictor. 
Robert  Hall noted that the Livingston  survey of six-month  expecta- 
tions for the S&P 500 provides a direct estimate  the expected return  to 
stocks without  any econometrics  and  wondered  how those expectations 
compared  with Blanchard's  estimates. He also noted that Blanchard's 
procedure  for measuring  expected returns  was similar  to that used in 
earlier  work  by William  Brainard,  John  Shoven, and  Laurence  Weiss re- 
ported in BPEA. Hall believed that this approach  provides much more 
reliable  answers  than  the "finance"  approach,  as exemplified  by Rajnish 
Mehra  and Edward  Prescott's work. He argued  that there is an advan- 
tage to focusing  on the levels of prices, as in these papers,  rather  than  on 
first differences if, as Hall believed, the equity premium  is mean-re- 
verting. Olivier J. Blanchard  137 
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